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Imagine someone pointing to a place in the iris of a Rembrandt eye
and saying: "The walls in my room should be painted this colour."
Wittgenstein
I. INTRODUCTION
A multifaceted debate over constitutional interpretation dominates
contemporary constitutional scholarship in the United States. Jurists dispute
whether constitutional meaning should be drawn exclusively from the text
of the Constitution,' restricted to its original meaning 2 or to the ascertain-
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, and Associate in the Martin Institute for Peace Studies and
Conflict Resolution, University of Idaho. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
University of Pennsylvania, Department of Philosophy, on December 3, 1990. I would like to thank
the following colleagues and friends who then, or at other times, commented, read other drafts, or
otherwise substantially helped this work along: Timothy Mahoney, Samuel Freeman, Elizabeth Hackett,
Maria Morales, Toomas Puhvel, Maureen E. Laflin, Clark Cunningham, and Sarah Works. I am most
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1. See Douglas Laycock, 'Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review," Texas
Law Review 59 (1981): 343-94; Robert Nagel, "Interpretation and Importance in Constitutional Law:
A Reassessment of Judicial Restraint," Nomos: Liberal Democracy 25 (1983): 181; Peter M. Shane,
"Conventionalism in Constitutional Interpretation and the Place of Administrative Agencies," American
University Law Review 36 (1987): 573-99.
2. See Stephen L. Carter, "The Right Questions in the Creation of Constitutional Meaning," Boston
University Law Review 66 (1986): 71-91; Carter, "Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate
Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle," Yale Law Journal 94 (1985): 821-72; Gary S.
Lawson, "An Interpretivist Agenda," Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 15 (1992): 157-61;
Antonin Scalia, "Originalism: The Lesser Evil," University of Cincinnati Law Review 57 (1989): 849-65.
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able intent of the Framers,3 subsumed under political theories showing the
structure4 or aims5 of constitutionalism, expanded to include Rawlsian,6
natural law, 7 utilitarian, 8 or other normative principles of justice,9 or
reformed to reflect the evolutionary ascension of moral consciousness in
America. I°
Despite the spectrum of theoretical viewpoints found in this contempo-
rary debate over constitutional meaning, one important group of persons
sometimes engaged in constitutional interpretation has largely ignored the
debate. Judges, those public officials charged with administering the laws,
for whom interpreting laws-including constitutions-is often a necessity,
have given the interpretive debate little attention." Some say this judicial
3. See Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1987); Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Robert Bork, "The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights
in the Constitution," Washington University Law Quarterly (1979): 695-701; Bork, "Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems," Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971): 1-35; Edwin Meese, 'The
Attorney General's View of the Supreme Court: Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention," Public
Administration Review 45 (1985): 701-19.
4. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980); Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, and William F. Harris, II, American
Constitutional Interpretation (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1986); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review
and the National Political Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
5. See Paul Brest, 'The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University
Law Review 60 (1980): 204-38. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988) (embracing an "inchoate vision" of
a liberal "commonwealth").
6. See David A.J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986), 12-14, 58-63, 72, 85, 96, 98-102; Richards, The Moral Criticism of Law (Encino, Cal.:
Dickenson Publishing, 1977), 44-56, 82-95, 144-49; David Schultz, "Justice Antonin Scalia's First
Amendment Jurisprudence: Free Speech, Press and Association Decisions," The Journal of Law and
Politics 9 (1993): 515, 516, 560.
7. See Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration
(Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986); Michael S. Moore, "A Natural Law Theory of
Interpretation," Southern California Law Review 58 (1985): 277-345; Roger Pilon, "Freedom,
Responsibility, and the Constitution: On Recovering Our Founding Principles," Notre Dame Law Review
68 (1993): 507-17.
8. See Bernard H. Siegan, Economic Liberties and the Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1980), 318-26.
9. See Paul W. Kahn, "Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory," Yale Law Journal 99
(1989): 1-85 (arguing for a "communitarian model in constitutional theory"); Stephen Macedo, Liberal
Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1991) (advocating "liberal constitutionalism" under a normative theory he calls "principled activism");
Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1987) (same); Frank
Michelman, "Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?" Creighton Law
Review 13 (1979): 487 (advocating a "public values" jurisprudence). Cf. David Millon, "Objectivity
and Democracy," New York University Law Review 67 (1992): 49 (arguing that "the legal profession's
power to determine the law's meaning offends the notion of self-government that lies at the heart of
the traditional rule-of-law ideal ... [making] the challenge [one] of develop[ing] responses that will
promote democracy in legal interpretation.").
10. Michael Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Perry,
The Constitution, The Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional
Policymaking by the Judiciary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
11. This is not to say judges have given it no attention. Some prominent judges have entered the
debate, most notably, Supreme Court Justices William Brennan and Antonin Scalia. See William J.
Brennan, Jr., "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification," in Sanford Levinson
and Steven Mailloux, eds., Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader (Evanston:
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silence comes from a predisposition toward judicial activism. 12 Contend-
ing that many judges legislate from the bench by basing their decisions on
personal visions of a just and fair society, 13 these critics charge that
activist judges ignore the juristic debate because following the true method
and restricting deliberation to the true criteria for constitutional interpreta-
tion would hinder the achievement of their political agendas., 4  Others
attribute the silence to "unimaginative legalism," 5 i.e., an unwillingness
to bend the slow machinery of common law development to expedite
"humane evolutions of legal principle."' 6  Perceiving the common law
method of incremental growth in decisional law as an outworn tradition
filled with legal rules diecast under antiquated forms to sustain obsolete
concepts of economic and social morality, proponents of this view castigate
the courts for undue "restraint,"' 7 for passive indifference to the moral
Northwestern University Press, 1988), 13-24; Scalia, "Originalism: The Lesser Evil."
12. See Thomas M. Blumenthal, "Judicial Activism-The Politicalization of the Right of Privacy,"
St. Louis University Public Law Review 11 (1992): 329-58; Gary L. McDowell, Equity and the
Constitution: The Supreme Court, Equitable Relief and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1982), xv, 132; Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional
Interpretation to Judge-Made Law (New York: Basic Books, 1986), ix. Cf. Stephen M. Griffin,
"Politics and the Supreme Court: The Case of the Bork Nomination," Journal of Law and Politics 5
(1989): 551-604 (claiming that judicial activism has been pervasive and has cut across political lines
over the past forty years).
13. See McDowell, Equity and the Constitution, xi, 3, 9-11 ("And the Court has been steadily
moving into the realm of legislation. Broad decrees 'fashioned and effectuated' for the whole country
on the basis of 'equitable principles' are, in essence, judicially created social policies."); Wolfe, The
Rise of Modern Judicial Review, 3 ("[T]here has been a gradual but dramatic shift in the character of
judicial review. What was once a distinctively judicial power, essentially different from legislative
power, has become merely another variant of legislative power."). See also Gary L. McDowell,
"Postscript: A Debate on Judicial Activism," in Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 109
(condemning Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), as decisions resting only on "personal predilection and political preference," and amounting to
"juridical contrivances at war with the Constitution").
14. See Blumenthal, "Judicial Activism," 332 ("The one undeniable fact is that the Court is straying
farther and farther from its own historic judicial underpinnings, and becoming more and more openly
political .. "); Robert Bork, The Tempting of America (Old Tappan, N.J.: Simon and Schuster, 1990),
349 (contending that activism threatens the "legitimacy of the law itself"); Earl M. Maltz, "Abortion,
Precedent, and the Constitution: A Comment on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey," Notre Dame Law Review 68 (1992): 11-32 (complaining about the influence of the "liberal
interventionists" on the Supreme Court). See also McDowell, Equity and the Constitution, 3, 9-11, 128-
32.
15. David A.J. Richards, "Moral Philosophy and the Search for Fundamental Values in
Constitutional Law," Ohio St. Law Journal 42 (1981): 329.
16. Ibid. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, "History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First
Amendment," Hastings Law Journal 44 (1993): 901 ("Tying the Constitution to past practices inhibits
the Constitution's growth and prevents essential constitutional evolution."); Perry, The Constitution, the
Courts, and Human Rights, 107-15; David A.J. Richards, "Rules, Policies and Neutral Principles: The
Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional Adjudication," Georgia Law Review 11
(1977): 1082-89, 1102-10.
17. See Donald E. Lively and Ellen S. Podgor, "Reckoning with the Bluster of Apolitical
Jurisprudence," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 19 (1992): 715-44 ("[Miodels of restraint or
abstinence are deceiving and inimical to constitutional development."). See also Elliot Mincberg, "A
Look at Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Judicial Prior Restraint and the First Amendment," Hastings
Law Journal 44 (1993): 871-79.
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underpinnings of the law, as well as to the pressing needs of modem
society. "
Another explanation for the judicial silence may be given. Before
attributing it to "activism," "legalism," "restraint," or some like term
negatively charged with emotive content, we should inquire whether any
of the juristic theories fit the practice of judging cases at law. I do not
mean here to form an inquiry based on the "old saw" Kant sought to dispel
that while something may be right in theory it won't work in practice.'9
We should not categorically suppose a tension between theory and practice.
We should, however, be wary of disharmony in the application of a theory
to a practice if the theory rests on considerations external to those that
guide the practice.
I want to suggest that there is a difference between constitutional theory
and constitutional interpretation. Indeed, there is a difference between
constitutional interpretation and constitutional adjudication. Those who
theorize about constitutional interpretation aim to discover some fundamen-
tal axioms of political morality, or a set of unassailable rules of interpreta-
tion that can (or ought to) be used to determine constitutional meaning.
This juristic enterprise differs fundamentally from the judicial task of
applying the Constitution while deciding concrete cases within the practice
of adjudication.
Nearly all who engage in the contemporary juristic debate ignore this
difference in practices.20  They assume that the axioms and rules they
identify as fundamental to their inquiries into constitutional meaning are
directly transferable and relevant to the practice of constitutional adjudica-
tion. This point of view, which I shall call "externality," explains the
judicial silence. Judges, I will argue, pay little attention to contemporary
juristic theory because it ill-fits the practice of deciding cases at law. Legal
theorists evaluate the results of judicial decisionmaking, and purport to
inform courts how to reach "correct" outcomes, by deriving constitutional
18. See Chemerinsky, "History, Tradition," 901-02, 912-13, 918-19; Richards, "Moral Philosophy
and the Search for Fundamental Values," 329.
19. See Immanuel Kant, On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory But It Won't Work in
Practice, trans. E.B. Ashton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974).
20. There are some notable exceptions. See Stanley Fish, "Almost Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence
of Richard Posner, Richard Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin," in Michael Brint and William Weaver, eds.,
Pragmatism in Law & Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 47-81; Fish, Doing What Comes
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1989) (especially "Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature,"
87-102; "Fish v. Fiss," 120-40; "Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory," 372-98); Thomas Morawetz,
"Understanding Disagreement, The Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism,
Critical Theory, and Judging," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 141 (1992): 371-456; Morawetz,
"The Epistemology of Judging: Wittgenstein and Deliberative Practices," Canadian Journal ofLaw and
Jurisprudence 3, no.2 (1990): 35-59. See also Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1960).
[Vol. 6: 353
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meaning from standards or criteria lying outside and determined antecedent
to the practice of adjudication; judges, by contrast, only approach questions
of constitutional meaning from within the context of, and while participat-
ing in, that practice.
Against this externalist trend in contemporary constitutional scholarship,
I recommend "internality," where adjudication stands independently of
externalist theory, as a craft-bound excellence with objective conditions of
mastery reflective of the internal demands of its practice. Influenced by the
later philosophy of Wittgenstein, I will argue that legal judgment is so
tightly interwoven with judicial practice that we cannot disentangle the
results of adjudication from its practice. From the internal point of view,
there is no authoritative access to constitutional meaning except as the
product of adjudication, and no means to evaluate that product except by
internal investigation of judicial practice. It follows that the judicial silence
is not part of a complex, multidirectional judicial conspiracy to achieve
certain subjective (and inconsistent) political goals, but a reasonable
response by practitioners within the craft-bound practice of adjudication for
whom the interpretive claims and normative considerations of externalist
theory are simply irrelevant and unnecessary.
II. INTERNALITY AND EXTERNALITY
Just as the master house painter knows that the color concepts used by
Rembrandt would ill serve the practice of his craft, judges may shun
contemporary constitutional theory because they perceive the theories as
irrelevant or possibly even harmful to the craft they practice. Adjudication,
I want to suggest, is a craft-bound excellence,2 like ship designing,
playing concert piano, novel writing (specific to genre), portrait and
landscape painting (adjusted to historical period), historical writing (specific
to period and movement), and participating in the game of baseball
(actually a multitude of craft excellences: hitting, base-running, pitching,
managing, umpiring, etc.). Each craft-bound excellence has objective
conditions of mastery reflective of the internal demands of the practice.
Some of these conditions are apparent even to the casual observer (failing
to make a ship seaworthy, striking the wrong chord, striking out), while the
careful student or critic eyes the practice with much keener appreciation of
a masterful performance (the allegory of Dionysian impotence in Waiting
for Godot, spiritual transcendence in a panoramic landscape representative
of the Hudson River School, Horowitz performing Beethoven's
"Pathetique," a batter "working" a walk or executing a suicide squeeze).
Yet even the seasoned critic stands as an "outsider" to the craft he
evaluates. Working within a craft as a practitioner involves a fundamental-
21. I owe the term "craft-bound excellence" to Professor James F. Ross.
Lind
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ly different cognitive approach to the craft from the evaluative or
descriptive enterprise undertaken by the critic. The practitioner must
develop a working knowledge of the conditions of excellence for her craft
in order to try to accommodate them in practice. By becoming an artist,
novelist, architect, or pianist, she subjects herself to the relevant craft-
standards of excellence. The critic, however, sees those conditions of
excellence not as conditions to satisfy, nor as the standards by which his
work shall be evaluated, but as material for his criticism.2 While
working with that material he, in turn, works within a separate craft
containing its own conditions of excellence. The literary critic and the art
critic, for example, must answer to the conditions of excellence for the
crafts of literary criticism and art criticism, not to the standards that obtain
in the specific literary or artistic fields about which they write.
The fundamentally different points of view from which the practitioner
and the critic approach a craft lead to two different perspectives on craft
excellence. The practice-oriented approach of the practitioner amounts to
an internalist point of view. The practitioner develops an understanding of
the conditions of excellence for her craft while pressed to meet the internal
demands of working within it. Thus the artist acquires a sense of mastery
in painting while learning to conform her creative ideals to fit the natural
limitations of her medium; the architect comes to understand architectural
excellence as she develops competence combining principles of material
and mathematics with those of architectural design. Practice and mastery
thus relate to one another symbiotically, as the practitioner's understanding
of craft excellence and her sense of working within the internal demands
of practice develop concurrently, each reacting to and working upon the
other. From the internalist point of view, therefore, the practice of a craft
objectively determines its conditions of excellence. The internalist looks
no further than to the internal demands and objectives of practice to justify
those conditions.
The critic's understanding of a craft and its conditions of excellence
arises in the very different context of working with the material of the craft
under the constraints and limitations set by the conditions of excellence
regulating his area of criticism. As an outsider to the craft, the critic does
not have an experiential understanding of its internal demands. Since the
practitioner's understanding of the conditions of excellence reflects those
internal demands, epistemological distance separates the critic from the set
of conditions of excellence accepted as objectively valid by practitioners.
Nevertheless, the critic can take an "internalist" approach by seeking to
apprehend those conditions through careful study of the objective
22. The "material" I have in mind here is the set of conditions of excellence for any craft under
critical evaluation. Of course, the critic also uses as "material" for criticism the craft-products of
practitioners within the subject craft.
[Vol. 6: 353
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manifestations of the craft practice, and then tailoring his critical appraisal
to coincide with or extend the practitioner's sense of craft mastery.
Critics who substitute external criteria of justification for the conditions
of excellence drawn from practice effectively spurn internalism for
externalism. The paradigm externalist critique evaluates a craft on the basis
of criteria external to its practice. Usually these criteria originate in the
critic's craft, as theoretic viewpoints more or less accepted under the
conditions of excellence for that craft. Sometimes the critic straight-
forwardly denounces practice-orientation, as when John Ruskin set out to
rescue the "distinctively political art" of architecture by "extricat[ing it]
from the confused mass of partial traditions and dogmata with which it
ha[d] become encumbered during imperfect or restricted practice."23 More
often, the critic assumes his theory reveals the true nature of the craft,
including the sense of its practice. Hence, in literary theory, rival
explanations of narrative form-structural, 24 semiotic, 25 and deconstruc-
tionist26-seek not to repudiate practice but to unfold its logical structure.
Whether a critic views craft mastery internally or externally matters a
great deal. His choice signals acceptance of a particular sense of excel-
lence. Moreover, it marks an orientation in interpretive inquiry that weighs
heavily on questions of meaning and linguistic usage. The externalist,
whether taking a reformative or a descriptive approach, employs interpre-
tive methodology and criteria drawn from outside the subject craft. He
further adopts the linguistic conventions of his craft, engrafting them on the
craft under evaluation. Marxists, for example, interpret literature and art
according to the doctrines of historical materialism, class struggle, and
alienation internal to their political philosophy.
27
While the externalist embosses interpretive and linguistic theories on the
craft he critiques, the critic who takes the internalist point of view studies
the practice of a craft to discern the interpretive methods and linguistic
conventions used by its practitioners. The internal point of view regards
interpretive methodology as a condition of practice. Practitioners of a craft,
23. John Ruskin, The Seven Lamps of Architecture (1849; reprint, New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1979), 10.
24. Roland Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives," in Image-Music-Text,
trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 79-124.
25. Algirdas Julien Greimas, "Elements of a Narrative Grammar," and "A Problem of Narrative
Semiotics: Objects of Value," in On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory, trans. Paul J.
Perron and Frank H. Collins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 63-83, 84-105.
26. See Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1982), 251-59.
27. See Ernst Bloch, Aesthetics and Politics, trans. Ronald Taylor (New York: Routledge, 1985);
Terry Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology: A Study in Marxist Literary Theory (New York: Routledge,
1985); Fredric Jameson, The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986 (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1988); Melvin Rader, "Marx's Interpretation of Art and Aesthetic Value," British
Journal of Aesthetics 7 (1967): 237-49; Maynard Solomon, Marxism and Art: Essays Classic and
Contemporary (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979). See also Ira Katznelson, Marxism and
the City (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) (Marxist analysis of urban architecture).
Lind
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on this model, adopt methods of interpretation that respond to the internal
demands of their practice. We see this approach repeatedly throughout the
history of historiography. The historians of ancient Greece found they
could satisfy the demands Homer and Herodotus had set for their
practice-to portray reality veritably and artistically-only by supplement-
ing the facts liberally and imaginatively, and by connecting events causally
through elaborate inferences.28 Roman historians developed the first
rational system of chronology so their histories could, with some assurance
of accuracy, document more than contemporary events set against a static,
atemporal past.29 Christian historians of the Middle Ages peppered their
histories with mythology and miracle in order to explain a world where an
anthropomorphic divinity directly intervened in and piloted human
affairs. 30  Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century historians in the United
States and Western Europe interpreted history in terms of power, progress,
and nationhood, to provide moral justification for the emergence of
powerful, modern industrial nation-states.3 ' More recently, historiography
has splintered, as many contemporary historians choose to forego the
traditional focus on statecraft and war under the conviction that they can
more accurately and richly depict human experience through intellectual,32
social,33  cultural,34  or local history.3  Critics who evaluate histories
28. See Charles William Fornara, The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983), 134-35.
29. See Harry Elmer Barnes, A History of Historical Writing, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Dover
Publications, 1962), 15. See generally, Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 36-76.
30. See Breisach, Historiography, 121-37; Benedetto Croce, History: Its Theory and Practice, trans.
Douglas Ainslie (1920; reprint, New York: Russell & Russell, 1960), 200-23.
31. See John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton (Lord Acton), "'The Study of History," in Essays in
the Study and Writing of History, ed. J. Rufus Fears (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), 504-05 ("For
the science of politics is the one science that is deposited by the stream of history ... and the
knowledge of the past, the record of truths revealed by experience, is eminently practical, as an
instrument of action and a power that goes to the making of the future."). Lord Acton argued that
histories must be written to show that the modem world, characterized by "the universal spirit of
investigation and discovery," distinctly differs from the medieval world, from which the modern age
cannot even be said to have come "by normal succession, with outward tokens of legitimate descent."
Ibid., 507-08. See also George Bancroft, The History of the United States of America from the
Discovery of the Continent, ed. R.B. Nye (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 39 (contending
that history should reflect that the United States was created "for the advancement of the principles of
everlasting peace and universal brotherhood"); Leopold von Ranke, Fursten und Volker, ed. W. Andreas
(Wiesbaden: E. Vollmer, 1957), 4-10 (characterizing the emergence of modern European nation-states
as several manifestations of the Divine will, and leading ultimately to a single European community
under God). See generally, Breisach, Historiography, 228-67; David W. Noble, Historians Against
History: The Frontier Thesis and the National Covenant in American Historical Writing Since 1830
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965).
32. See Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and
Character Since the 1880's (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); Vernon Louis Parrington, Main
Currents in American Thought: An Interpretation of American Literature from the Beginnings to 1920
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927); Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as
Symbol and Myth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950).
33. See Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism: 15th-18th Century, trans. Sian Reynolds, 3
vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1981); Tamara Hareven, Anonymous Americans: Explorations in
Nineteenth-Century Social History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971). See generally,
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written within each of these methods of historical interpretation must be
sensitive to the dependence of the history on the internal demands and
conditions of excellence obtaining in the craft of historical writing at the
time and place involved.36
Internality further perceives meaning as perforce bound up in practice.
Whether the "meaning" is linguistic, historical, artistic, or otherwise, the
internalist point of view regards it as a product of craft-bound interpretive
acts. Here we find a strong parallel between internalism and the later
philosophy of Wittgenstein.
III. WITGENSTEIN ON MEANING IN PRACTICE
In a series of works running from the early 1930s until the end of his
lifetime, Wittgenstein emphasized the integration of judgment with
practice.37 For a whole range of central human activities, he found that
Breisach, Historiography, 361-78.
34. See David Burner, Robert Marcus, and Torj Tilson, America through the Looking Glass: A
Historical Reader in Popular Culture (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974); Richard Wightman
Fix and T.J. Jackson Lears, eds., The Power of Culture: Critical Essays in American History (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992).
35. See H.P.R. Finberg and V.H.T. Skipp, Local History: Objective and Pursuit (Newton Abbot,
England: David & Charles, 1967); J. Sanford Rikoon and Judith Austin, Interpreting Local Culture and
History (Moscow, Idaho: University of Idaho Press, 1991).
36. This point comes across quite strongly in the work of some historians and philosophers of
history. For example, Charles William Fornara claims that since the "imaginative recreation and
inferential elaboration from the facts" common among historians in ancient Greece was a "necessary
consequence of the demands" of the practice of historical narrative as it then and there existed, "the
categories of 'fact' and 'fiction,' 'truth and falsity,' 'honesty and dishonesty,' so often applied to the
discredit of the ancients" are simply irrelevant. Fornara, Nature of History, 134-35. Similarly,
Benedetto Croce, while highly critical of Medieval Christian historiography, denied that it is susceptible
to any form of general externalist objection: "To censure ecclesiastical history because it overrules and
oppresses profane history will perhaps be justified, as we shall see, from certain points of view and in
a certain sense; but it is not justifiable as a general criticism of the idea of that history, and, indeed,
when we formulate the censure in these terms we are unconsciously pronouncing a warm eulogy of it."
Croce, History: Its Theory and Practice, 205. See also Breisach, Historiography, 126:
Medieval historians did not grant primary importance to secular changes. The true history was
the story of human redemption through Christ in time. And if we study these accounts of the
integration of people into the Latin world, accounts of new kingdoms and dynasties, the rise and
fall of kings and emperors, and great battles, we must not 'read over' the many passages that
testify to the chronicler's basic view of the world, even though such passages may have no
'factual' value for one who gathers data. When we ignore that view, the medieval version of the
Christian faith, then medieval historiography is left without true continuity, spark of life, drama,
and, worst of all, almost all meaning.
37. While the concept of practice figures critically in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, it has over
the years received far less scholarly consideration than other central aspects of his thought, such as rule-
following and language-games. Only recently have philosophers, as well as legal scholars, begun to
give it the attention it deserves. See Gordon Baker, "Following Wittgenstein: Some Signposts for
Philosophical Investigations §§ 143-242," in S. Holtzman and C. Leich, eds., Wittgenstein: To Follow
a Rule (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 60-64; Kjell S. Johannessen, 'The Concept of
Practice in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Inquiry 31 (1988): 357-69; Alasdair Maclntyre, "Colors,
Culture, and Practices," in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds.,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume XVII: The Wittgenstein Legacy (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1992); Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984);
Morawetz, "Understanding Disagreement"; Morawetz, "The Epistemology of Judging"; Dennis M.
Patterson, "Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative," in Wittgenstein and Legal Theory
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judgment so tightly interweaves with practice that we cannot disentangle
the results of its doing, its understanding, its gestures, and its discourse
from the practice or activity of the doing, understanding, gesturing,
discoursing. That is, Wittgenstein saw a fundamental mistake of under-
standing38 in what I call the externalist method of standing outside any
central human activity-whether it be science, music, art, religion,
mathematics, law, or simply thinking, reading, or knowing-to evaluate,
criticize, or justify the results of judgment, the concepts used, or the
linguistic meanings employed.
Wittgenstein attributed the confusion of externalism to a misunderstand-
ing regarding the nature of language. As he saw it, the externalist method
treats language as strictly discursive, as "a calculus proceeding according
to exact rules."39  Within this calculus, the externalist-the "spectator,"
the "observer"4 -treats words and concepts as symbols operating in
accordance with fixed rules of usage, each possessing an absolute, all-
inclusive, essentialist "real definition."42 The externalist, on this account,
inquires into the "meaning" of a word or concept by trying to apprehend
its "real definition" through abstracting from the apparently "inessential
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 85-121; Merrill Ring, "'Bring me a slab!': Meaning, Speakers, and
Practices," in Robert L. Arrington and Hans-Johann Glock, eds., Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations: Text and Context (New York: Routledge, 1991), 12-34. Some of these writers conceive
of practice as a supplemental concept for Wittgenstein, a concept which elucidates or supports an
arguably more fundamental concept like rule-following. See Baker, "Following Wittgenstein," 63;
Johannessen, "Concept of Practice," 363-68. Others maintain that to understand what Wittgenstein
meant by practice we must collapse that notion into some other, such as pragmatism or custom. See
Patterson, "Law's Pragmatism," (pragmatism); McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning, 34-51 (custom). In
this essay I treat practice as a central and independent concept in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, a
concept irreducible to other notions or epistemological strategies. In this respect my reading of
Wittgenstein most closely resembles Maclntyre and Morawetz. But see Thomas Morawetz, Wittgenstein
and Knowledge (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 5 (mistakenly equating "practice" and "language-
game"). I explore in depth these various readings of Wittgenstein and the importance of his work for
jurisprudence in 'The Relevance of Wittgenstein for Legal Theory" (forthcoming).
38. At times Wittgenstein describes this mistake of understanding in terms of a "disease," a
psychological disorder of the understanding. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations
of Mathematics, ed. G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, rev.
ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), VI-31 ("Our disease is one of wanting to explain.") (emphasis
added).
39. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, in The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper &
Row, 1958), 25. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3d ed.
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968), 1:81 ("[I]n philosophy we often compare the use of
words with games and calculi which have fixed rules...") (emphasis in original); ibid. (admitting that
at one time he thought "that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a
calculus according to definite rules") (emphasis in original).
40. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI:7.
41. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:54.
42. Ibid.
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features"43 of use either its "essence"" or the "law" which determines
the way it is used.45
To Wittgenstein this approach makes the search for linguistic meaning
an irresolvable philosophical puzzle.46 Once the externalist posits a "real
definition" for a word or concept, Wittgenstein assumed he would try to
apply it consistently. 47 Suggesting that this effort often leads to paradoxi-
cal results, as where a new application of an expression falls outside the
boundary of the real definition, Wittgenstein conjectured that we can expect
the externalist to offer a reformed definition, believing that this time he has
correctly identified the essence of the expression. Take the concept "time":
First the question is asked 'What is time?' This question makes it
appear that what we want is a definition. We mistakenly think that a
definition is what will remove the trouble (as in certain states of
indigestion we feel a kind of hunger which cannot be removed by
eating). The question is then answered by a wrong definition; say:
'Time is the motion of the celestial bodies.' The next step is to see
that this definition is unsatisfactory. But this only means that we
don't use the word 'time' synonymously with 'motion of the celestial
bodies.' However in saying that the first definition is wrong, we are
now tempted to think that we must replace it by a different one, the
correct one.48
The extemalist would thus find himself caught in a dialectical process
with no logical outlet. This definitional puzzle exhibits the logic of
dialectic as each "real definition" necessarily contains the logical possibility
of its own refutation. Since the definition is separate from the concrete
usage of the word or concept, the possibility always remains that the next
application will contradict or fall outside the boundary fixed by the
definition.49 To Wittgenstein, no abstract definition going to the supposed
"essence" of a term can avoid this logical possibility of refutation through
paradoxical application.
While exhibiting the logic of dialectic, the externalist puzzle is not in any
respect suggestive of a dialectical progression. Wittgenstein saw it as a
43. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Brown Book, in The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper &
Row, 1958), 1:73.
44. See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:97 ("We are under the illusion that what is
peculiar, profound, essential, in our investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence
of language."); Wittgenstein, The Brown Book, 1:17 ("We are inclined to say that the description has
left out the essential feature of such a process and given us accessory features only."); ibid., 1:73 ("It
seemed to us that the essence of the process of deriving was here presented in a particular dress and
that by stripping it of this we should get at the essence.").
45. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 27.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid. This assumption follows from the externalist notion of language as an "exact calculus."
48. Ibid.
49. See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:80 ("[W]e are not equipped with rules for
every possible application of [a word].").
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static dialectical movement-a circle 5°-wherein the process of defini-
tional reform continues ad infinitum. He believed externalism can offer no
escape from this circle because few, if any, words conform to the standard
of exactness required for a workable "real definition."'" For most words,
there is "no one exact usage,"52 "no one relation of name to object,"53
no "strict"'  or "fixed ' 55 meaning, "no sharp boundary"56 marking off
appropriate use. More importantly, the logical possibility of paradoxical
application remains for even those words seemingly covered by complete
definitions.57 So long as externalists search for meaning "by contemplat-
ing the expression itself,"58 or by appealing to "higher order" princi-
ples,59 Wittgenstein contended they will remain enmeshed in the puzzle
of definition, because "a word hasn't got a meaning given to it, as it were,
by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific
investigation into what the word really means. ' 6°
To Wittgenstein, "meaning" goes no further than use. "[T]he meaning
of a word is its use in the language' 6  and nothing more: "[I]t is the
particular use of a word only which gives the word its meaning." 62
Fruitful inquiry into the meaning of an expression consists solely in an
examination of the "meaning someone has given to it"' 63 in "actual
50. Cf. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI:7-8.
51. See Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 25 ("Our ordinary use of the language conforms to this
standard of exactness only in rare cases.... We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use;
not because we don't know their real definition, but because there is no real 'definition' to them. To
suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play
a game according to strict rules.").
52. Ibid.
53. Wittgenstein, The Brown Book, 11:19.
54. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 27.
55. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:79 (emphasis omitted).
56. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 27. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:84
("[Tihe application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules.").
57. See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:80.
58. Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. Denis
Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), § 601.
59. See Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 11:29-35. See also Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, 1:97 (appealing to a "super-order" of "super-concepts" which reveal "the
incomparable essence of language").
60. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 28.
61. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:43 (emphasis added). See also Wittgenstein, The
Brown Book, 11: 19 ("[lit is the usage of the 'name' and in fact the detail of this usage which gives the
naming its peculiar significance."); Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe, trans.
Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schattle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), I:4-19
(discussing how we learn the meaning of color concepts through use); Wittgenstein, Last Writings on
the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I: Preliminary Studies for Part II of Philosophical Investigations,
ed. G.H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A.E. Aue (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990), §§ 271-94.
62. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 69 (emphasis added). See also ibid., 73 ("The meaning of the
expression depends entirely on how we go on using it.") (emphasis added).
63. Ibid., 28. See also ibid., 27 ("[W]ords have those meanings which we have given them.").
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use. '64  Wittgenstein cautioned against treating this inquiry as an
invitation to extrapolate from use supposedly common elements for
definitional purposes. Treating "use" as a synonym for "application,,
65
he perceived a "yawning gulf' between "illustration" through essentialist
definitions-the necessary first step in the dialectical puzzle of defini-
tion-and "application" in particular cases.' And he stressed we must
overcome "the illusory image of a greater depth' 67 by recognizing that
nothing lies hidden beneath the concrete case:
The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general
term one had to find the common element in all its applications has
shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not only led to no
result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete
cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of
the general term.68
Wittgenstein thus regarded meaning as determined by the use, the
application, of a word or concept in particular cases. Understanding the
meaning of a proposition requires inquiry into "how [it] is used in this
case, and how it's used in others. 69 Yet this inquiry must not take place
in a vacuum. Wittgenstein advised that we only "understand a proposition
as a member of a system of propositions. '"70 Only within a system of
propositions, employing what he calls a "language-game," does a word or
concept take on meaning; only within such a system, that is, does a
contraption become a gearbox,7' two sticks of unequal length become
clock-hands,72 one rod become a yardstick,73 another rod a lever.74 And
64. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1: 124 (emphasis added). See also Wittgenstein, The
Blue Book, 27 ("There is no one exact usage of the word 'knowledge'; but we can make up several
such usages, which will more or less agree with the ways the word is actually used.") (emphasis added).
65. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Raymond Hargreaves and
Roger White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), § 44 ("The use, the application .... ).
66. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, V:37. See also Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Remarks, § 164 ("This is the unbridgeable gulf between rule and application, or law and
special case.").
67. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI:31.
68. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 19-20.
69. Ibid., 23.
70. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, § 15. See also ibid., § 82 ("It isn't a proposition which
I put against reality as a yardstick, it's a system of propositions.") (emphasis in original); Wittgenstein,
On Certainty, § 141 ("When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single
proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)") (emphasis
in original); ibid., § 225 ("What I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions.")
(emphasis in original); Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 5 ("The sign (the sentence) gets its significance
from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs."). Cf. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the
Philosophy of Psychology, 2 vols., ed. G.H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and
M.A.E. Aue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 11:190 ("It seems therefore, that our
concepts, the use of our words, are constrained by a factual framework.").
71. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, § 15.
72. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M.
Anscombe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), § 228.
73. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, § 54.
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to regard a proposition as imbued with meaning in this sense-from its use
within a system of language-is to say it has life: "As a part of the system
of language, one may say, the sentence has life. 75
Wittgenstein used the term "language-game" to make the point that the
use which makes a proposition a "live proposition" is something more than
simply being a symbol or sign within a system of language, moved about
and acted upon by the system's rules of usage.76 He explained that "the
term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. 77
Language, on this account, cannot be disentangled from action. Under-
standing the meaning any "live" proposition acquires from its use within
a system of language necessarily requires inquiry into the activity or "whole
practice" which constitutes the form of life within which the system-the
language-game-serves as the language of discourse.78
From this Wittgenstein hypothesized that one can approach a language-
game from either of two very different directions: "Language is a labyrinth
of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you
approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way
about. '79 The first side is that of practice, while the second involves
interpretation and rule-following unaccompanied by action: "To understand
a sentence," Wittgenstein wrote, "means to understand a language. To
understand a language means to be master of a technique."8°  In the
language-game motif, understanding a language-game thus depends on
being a master player. One does not become a master player, however, by
simply becoming acquainted with the rules of the game. The master player
learns the rules through participation. Through "the day-to-day practice
of playing," 81 the master player exhibits her understanding of the rules by
her actions-by "'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual
cases."82 Wittgenstein stressed that this form of action in practice differs
importantly from interpretation, "the substitution of one expression of the
rule for another. '83 It also constitutes the only true form of rule-follow-
ing, for only by participating in a practice-playing the game--does one
actually obey the rules:
74. Ibid., § 14.
75. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 5.
76. Ibid., 4-5.
77. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:23.
78. Wittgenstein, The Brown Book, 1:48 (emphasis added). On Wittgenstein's extremely opaque
notion of "forms of life," see Nicholas Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study
of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (Albany: SUNY Press, 1981), 17-32.







Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol6/iss2/9
1994]
And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is
obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey
a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be
the same thing as obeying it."4
Practice thus served for Wittgenstein as the form of life, the "proto-
phenomenon" wherein language-games are "played. ' 85  To communicate
in a language-game involves more than understanding its rules of usage.
Communication requires participation-'"the day-to-day practice of playing"
the game-such that one becomes a "master" in the technique of judging
in that language-game. Considered in the abstract, outside the context of
practice, the rules of a language-game can justify anything.86 Hence, for
Wittgenstein, to understand the meaning of a proposition depends not just
on familiarity with the rules of a language-game, but on acquaintance with
the practice within which those rules, and the proposition, are used.87
And any inquiry into meaning must begin with the question: "In what
practice is this proposition anchored?" 88-for "[o]nly in the practice of
a language can a word have meaning. 89
To Wittgenstein, practice thus places epistemological distance 9° between
the externalist and the practitioner:
For someone who has no knowledge of such things a diagram
representing the inside of a radio receiver will be a jumble of
meaningless lines. But if he is acquainted with the apparatus and its
function, that drawing will be a significant picture for him.9'
The engineer or radio technician understands the diagram to the extent he
or she is acquainted with the practice of radio design and circuitry. While
acknowledging the ever present "danger of wanting to find an expression's
84. Ibid., 1:202.
85. Ibid., 1:654.
86. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI:39. See also Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, 1:201.
87. Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, 111:317 ("Practices give words their meaning."). See also
Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 69 ('The use of the word in practice is its meaning.").
88. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 11:35 (emphasis added). See also
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 103 ("And now if I were to say 'It is my unshakeable conviction that
etc.,' this means in the present case too that I have not consciously arrived at the conviction by
following a particular line of thought, but that it is anchored in all my questions and answers, so
anchored that I cannot touch it.").
89. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI:41 (emphasis added).
90. See Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 108:
'But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon?'
If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Not
merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system
of physics forbids us to believe it.... But suppose... we met the reply: 'We don't know how one
gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once that they are there; and even you can't
explain everything.' We should feel ourselves intellectually very distant from someone who said this.
(Emphasis added and omitted).
91. Wittgenstein, Zettel, § 201.
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meaning by contemplating the expression itself, and the frame of mind in
which one uses it, ' '92 Wittgenstein advised that no realm of central human
activity can be described or understood except by "always thinking of the
practice."93  Only through "the practice of language""9 can we describe
logical inference; it is only through the practice of mathematics that
mathematical signs come to have meaning;95 only through the practice of
calculating do we develop understanding of the nature of calculating.96
Understanding how to use words and concepts thus depends for
Wittgenstein on more than learning the rules of a language-game. Training
in a language-game rests in part on explanation,97 but to become a master
player capable of making "expert judgments" one must learn the language
through "experience" as a participant in the practice to which the language-
game is the language of discourse.98 The engineer understands how to use
a language-game-the diagram of radio circuitry-because he or she is
learned in the field of radio technology. This is not just acquaintance with
the language-game, the "diagram," but with the apparatus and its function,
the whole practice within which the language-game operates.
To "understand" the use of an expression within a language-game thus
required, for Wittgenstein, experiential understanding. It is this fact which
makes the gulf between the craft master and the externalist unbridgeable.
"By being educated in a technique," he wrote, "we are also educated to
have a way of looking at the matter which is just as firmly rooted as that
technique." 99  Wittgenstein thus saw internalism and externalism as
fundamentally different viewpoints: people who play the game of chess
92. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 601.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid., § 501 (emphasis added).
95. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, V:16.
96. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §§ 43-50.
97. See Wittgenstein, Zettel, § 186 ("Understanding is effected by explanation; but also by
training."). But see Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, 111:291 (description is not teaching).
98. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, II:xi, 227h. See also ibid, 1:197-203; Wittgenstein,
Remarks on Colour, 1:77-78, 111:120-23 ("But can I describe the practice of people who have a concept,
e.g. 'reddish-green,' that we don't possess?-In any case I certainly can't teach this practice to
anyone."); ibid., 111:291 (one learns a game (tennis) by playing, "knowledge by acquaintance");
Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI:33; Wittgenstein, Last Writings, §§ 915,
917-18. Wittgenstein explains:
An important fact here is that we leam certain things only through long experience and not from
a course in school. How, for instance, does one develop the eye of a connoisseur? Someone says,
for example: 'This picture was not painted by such-and-such a master'--the statement he makes
is thus not an aesthetic judgment, but one that can be proved by documentation.... A great deal
of experience was necessary. That is, the learner probably had to look at and compare a large
number of pictures by various masters again and again. In doing this he could have been given
hints. Well, that was the process of learning. But then he looked at a picture and made a
judgment about it. In most cases he was able to list reasons for his judgment, but generally it
wasn't they that were convincing.
Ibid., § 925.
99. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, IV:35.
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understand it differently than those who do not play;t°° using a mathe-
matical technique to avoid contradiction differs importantly from philoso-
phizing against contradiction in mathematics; °'0 in music, to "under-
stand[] a musical phrase may also be called understanding a language,"' 2
an understanding inaccessible to those untrained in the craft of music:
I think of a quite short phrase, consisting of only two bars. You
say 'What a lot that's got in it!' But it is only, so to speak, an optical
illusion if you think that what is there goes on as we hear it. ('It all
depends who says it.') (Only in the stream of thought and life do
words have meaning.)10 3
IV. EXTERNALITY AND INTERNALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
The internalist standpoint I recommend for constitutional adjudication
shares this Wittgensteinian view that meaning and judgment are inextrica-
bly interwoven with practice. Approaching constitutional adjudication from
this point of view suggests that the current debate strikes a silent chord
with judges not because of a judicial propensity for activism or a legalistic
fear of rectificatory innovation, but because judges and legal theorists
practice different crafts. Like every other craft-bound excellence,
adjudication depends for its justification upon objective conditions of
mastery which cannot be disentangled from the internal demands of its
practice. Internal investigation of adjudicative practice reveals a set of
objective conditions of neutrality which constrain freedom in judicial
decision while establishing a domain for inventive genius. Strictly oriented
toward fairness and justice in the resolution of legal disputes, these internal
conditions require that judicial decisions be arrived at impartially,'04 rest
on reasoned explanation,0 5 and satisfy objectives of coherence' °6 and
100. See Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, 1:75, 111:119.
101. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, IV:55.
102. Wittgenstein, Zettel, § 172. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Psychology, 11:503.
103. Wittgenstein, Zettel, § 173. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Psychology, 11:504.
104. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927). See also John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of
the Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1909), 109-10 ("The essence of ajudge's office is that
he shall be impartial, that he is to sit apart, is not to interfere voluntarily in affairs .. "); Patricia
Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 211 ("Impartiality is the
highest ideal toward which judges can aspire.").
105. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ.) ("The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon
the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always
have exercised: reasoned judgment."); Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1797 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("Invalidating this quite reasonable [state statutory] scheme is bad enough; even worse is
the Court's failure to explain precisely what is wrong with it.").
In dissenting from the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
492 U.S. 490, 552 (1989), Justice Blackmun stated:
Finally, the plurality asserts that the trimester framework cannot stand because the State's interest in
potential life is compelling throughout pregnancy, not merely after viability. The opinion contains
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workability,"°7 while setting articulative boundaries for future applica-
tions. °8  Excellence in adjudicative practice consists in satisfying these
conditions of neutrality.t09
External legal theorists ignore these conditions of excellence, just as they
do the craft-bound nature of adjudication, as they extract postulates for
constitutional interpretation from disciplines not only external to judicial
practice, but outside law. Drawing upon principles and methods internal
to other craft-bound enterprises such as philosophy,"0 literary criti-
not one word of rationale for its view of the State's interest. This "it-is-so-because-we-say-so"
jurisprudence constitutes nothing other than an attempted exercise of brute force; reason, much less
persuasion, has no place.
106. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1989); Burnet v. Coronado Oil
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandies, J., dissenting).
107. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812 (refusing to overrule Roe v. Wade because, in part, while the rule
announced in that case "has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable"); Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (overruling earlier case which
established a rule that had proven to be "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice"); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 179 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring) (approving of the rule adopted by the
Court because it set "an unequivocal, definite and workable rule of evidence for state and federal
courts," yet criticizing the rule for continuing "the process of erosion of civil rights of the citizen in
recent years."); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) (Taney, C.J.) (expressing approval of
the commerce clause "original package" doctrine because it was "perhaps the best [rule] that could have
been adopted for preserving the right of the United States on the one hand, and of the States on the
other, and preventing collision between them"). See also Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116
(1965).
108. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992) ("Our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
remains a delicate and fact-sensitive one .... of necessity one of line-drawing .. "); Saffle v. Parks,
494 U.S. 484, 505 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for speaking in "generalities
... [and] offer[ing] no guidance despite its concession that the 'precise contours of this exception may
be difficult to discern"'); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 340 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence for being "open-ended and standardless"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds) (suggesting that the boundaries the
Supreme Court must draw in its due process analysis are "not a series of isolated points ... [but lines
along] a rational continuum...").
109. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully develop the set of conditions of adjudicative
practice here mentioned. For a more complete discussion of these conditions, see Douglas Lind,
Wrongness and Overruling, forthcoming.
Despite the similar terminology, I do not mean by the term "conditions of neutrality" to join the
many who have attempted to fill out Herbert Wechsler's notion of "neutral principles." See Bork,
"Neutral Principles"; Kent Greenawalt, "The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles," Columbia
Law Review 78 (1978): 982-1021; Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law," Harvard Law Review 73 (1959), 1-35, reprinted in Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law:
Selected Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). Wechsler sought to draw attention to
the substantive rules or principles of decision that constitute the holdings of particular cases. He argued
that all substantive rules or principles of decision had to be general and neutral in application and effect
to all who could conceivably fall under them. See Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law, xiii-xiv,
21. See also Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller, "Toward 'Neutral Principles' in the Law: Selections
from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler," Columbia Law Review 93 (1993): 854, 923-31.
By "conditions of neutrality" I mean conditions of craft excellence specific to the craft (practice) of
adjudication. These conditions do not directly go to the substance of any rules or principles of decision,
but rather address only the performance of the practitioners (judges) who work within the craft.
110. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977),
149 ("Constitutional law can make no genuine advance until it isolates the problem of rights against
the state and makes that problem part of its own agenda. That argues for a fusion of constitutional law
and moral theory, a connection that, incredibly, has yet to take place."); Jeffrie Murphy, "Cruel and
Unusual Punishments," in Retribution, Justice, and Therapy: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Boston:
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cism,"' and political science,12 externalist jurists tend to follow a
three-step critical path. First, they assume a posture of fidelity to the
Constitution, often, but variously, prescribing a "genuinely constitutional
attitude"'1 3 or a "sharp jurisprudential vision"' 4 said to be required, as
a necessary condition for legitimacy, of all who set out to interpret the
Constitution. This attitude or vision takes many forms and is usually
characterized as a general, but vague, normative goal, such as "integri-
ty,""' 5  "cultural awareness,"' 16  "toleration,""17  "conscientious-
ness,' t 8 "constitutional faith,' '119  "constitutional aspiration,"'' 20  "moral
aspiration,"' t21 "charity," 122  "principled" interpretation, t23  or grasping
the "reasoning spirit" of the Constitution.
24
D. Reidel, 1979), 223 ("[I]f one can mount a good argument that to treat a person in a certain way is
gravely unjust or would violate some basic human right of his, this is also and necessarily a good
argument that it is unconstitutional to treat him in this way."); W.A. Parent, "Privacy, Morality, and the
Law," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983): 269-88 ("My purpose is to show how contemporary
privacy jurisprudence could have benefited from the use of disciplined philosophical analysis."); Graham
Walker, Moral Foundations of Constitutional Thought: Current Problems, Augustinian Prospects
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) (suggesting an Augustinian perspective for constitutional
interpretation); Richard Weisberg, "On the Use and Abuse of Nietzsche for Modem Constitutional
Theory," in Interpreting Law and Literature, 181-92 (Nietzschean perspective).
111. See Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York: Routledge, 1992)
(deconstruction). Cf. Clare Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine," in
Interpreting Law and Literature, 285-318 ("My approach to contract doctrines owes much to traditions
of scholarship outside of law, and shares much with other attempts to bring these traditions to bear on
legal materials and issues .... I have drawn on another critical tradition, described loosely as
poststructuralism.").
112. See Henry J. Abraham, The Judiciary: The Supreme Court in the Governmental Process, 4th
ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1977); Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political
Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980); Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration;
Macedo, Liberal Virtues; Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution; McDowell, Equity and the
Constitution.
113. Barber, On What the Constitution Means, 10.
114. Lively and Podgor, "Reckoning with the Bluster of Apolitical Jurisprudence," 735. Lively and
Podgor characterize the vision they have in mind as one of "cultural awareness." Ibid., 742-44.
115. Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual
Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993); Dworkin, "The Center Holds!" The New York Review
of Books 39 (August 13, 1992): 29-33; Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1986).
116. Lively and Podgor, "Reckoning with the Bluster of Apolitical Jurisprudence," 742-43.
117. David A.J. Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989); Richards, Toleration and the Constitution.
118. See Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 23, 46, 50, 54, 85, 95, 170-71 (calling the
requisite point of view that of a "conscientious" or "critical" "interpreter" of the Constitution).
119. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
120. Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration.
121. Barber, On What the Constitution Means, 11.
122. John Arthur, The Unfinished Constitution: Philosophy and Constitutional Practice (Belmont,
Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1989), 2-3, 296-97.
123. Bork, "Neutral Principles," 1-35 ("neutral principles"); Dworkin, Life's Dominion
("constitution of principle"); Dworkin, "The Center Holds!" 29-33 ("constitution as principle," "charter
of principle," "principled integrity"); Dworkin, Law's Empire ("principled integrity"); Macedo, Liberal
Virtues, 189-200 ("principled activism"); Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 5, 49-85 (same).
124. Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 21.
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From these visionary perspectives, theorists then posit axioms of political
morality and rules of interpretation which together constitute the formal
method of each externalist theory. The axioms of political morality usually
consist of comprehensive theories of rights,'25 justice,'26 or constitution-
al democracy 27 drawn from one or more of several sources, including the
text, structure, and history of the Constitution, as well as sources wholly
independent of the Constitution itself. For some external theorists, these
principles of political morality stand independently of interpretive theory
as self-defining a priori concepts; others combine the principles with
various, sometimes quite elaborate, theories of interpretation. 28 In either
case, the external theorists contend that their normative principles allow
them to discern what the Constitution "actually" means, i.e., not simply
what the courts say it means.129
Finally, external theorists use their avowed insight into the Constitution's
"actual meaning" to reveal judicial error (the "derelicts of constitutional
law"130 ). They claim to identify instances (specific cases as well as
whole bodies of constitutional doctrine) where a court, usually the Supreme
Court, has "undermined" the "true" meaning of the Constitution.'3 ' Often
they go further, connecting alleged judicial mistakes with political agendas,
contending in effect that judicial error is a product of judicial decision-
making which is unduly political. Those who work from this political
hypothesis strive to expose the Court acting in an improperly political
fashion-whether as an activist body "overleaping its bounds,' 32 or as
a politically reactionary institution bent on abstaining, through an attitude
of undue restraint, from complete fulfillment of its intended function. 33
125. See ibid. (natural rights); Dworkin, Life's Dominion; Dworkin, Law's Empire.
126. See Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism; Richards, Toleration and the
Constitution; Richards, The Moral Criticism of Law.
127. See Arkes, Beyond the Constitution; Bork, "Neutral Principles," 1-35; Choper, Judicial Review
and the National Political Process; Ely, Democracy and Distrust; Millon, "Objectivity and Democracy."
Cf. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue, 314 (offering a critical account of constitutional theorizing based
on "an implicit inchoate vision of a society as commonwealth, inhabited by citizens who seek to
promote the common good rather than individual interests").
128. See Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit. See generally Costas Douzinas and Ronnie
Warrington (with Shaun McVeigh), Post-modern Jurisprudence: The Law of Texts in the Texts of Law
(New York: Routledge, 1992).
129. See Barber, On What the Constitution Means, 6-11 (claiming to adopt a "genuinely
constitutional attitude" for the purpose of constructing "a general theory of what the Constitution
actually means").
130. Philip B. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970), 186; See also McDowell, Equity and the Constitution, 129 (quoting Kurland).
Cf. Barber, On What the Constitution Means, 10 (charging the Supreme Court with "distortion" in its
interpretations of the Constitution).
131. Arkes, Beyond the Constitution, 75.
132. Berger, Government by Judiciary, 415; McDowell, Equity and the Constitution, 134.
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We can perhaps best apprehend this critical standpoint of jurisprudential
externality by briefly considering some of its exemplars. Take Ronald
Dworkin. In a long series of books and articles written over several
years, 34 Professor Dworkin has constructed a normative theory of
adjudication he calls "law as integrity 1 35 or "principled integrity."'1
36
An idealistic vision of judicial decision-making which calls upon judges to
aspire to the standard of an imaginary superjudge-Hercules-law as
integrity holds that right outcomes in adjudication are the product of
inquiries which follow two interpretive dimensions, "fit and justifica-
tion." 37  The dimension of fit requires historical consistency in legal
decision; it imposes on judges an affirmative obligation to follow
precedent, other things being equal.138  The other things requiring
consideration come under the dimension of justification. Here Dworkin
calls for the "fusion of constitutional law and moral theory, '1 39 as he
directs judges to inquire "which interpretation shows the legal record to be
the best it can be from the standpoint of substantive political morality.' 14°
Law as integrity, that is, affirms a constitutional decision (declares it to be
"right 141) if it historically coheres with the whole of constitutional law
as it stands at the time the decision is rendered, unless that requirement of
historical fit is overridden by considerations of political morality. For
Dworkin, the critical moral consideration is the priority of rights. He
claims that individual rights "trump" all countervailing considerations of
governmental policy. 142 While he grounds this rights thesis primarily in
his own political philosophy, Dworkin claims it also can be found in "the
abstract moral command[s] of the Constitution."' 143 He contends that the
Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment,
raises "profound questions of political morality" which necessarily require
"value judgments." 44 As a result, constitutional adjudication becomes for
134. See Dworkin, Life's Dominion; Dworkin, "The Center Holds!" 29-33; Dworkin,
"Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled," University of Chicago Law
Review 59 (1992): 381-432; Dworkin, "Equality, Democracy, and Constitution: We the People in
Court," Alberta Law Review 28 (1990): 324-46; Dworkin, "Book Review: Bork's Jurisprudence,"
University of Chicago Law Review 57 (1990): 657-77; Dworkin, Law's Empire, A Matter of Principle
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977).
135. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, 176-275.
136. Dworkin, 'The Center Holds!" 31. See also ibid., 32 ("integrity of principle").
137. Dworkin, Law's Empire, 255-57.
138. Ibid. See also Dworkin, "The Center Holds!" 31-32.
139. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 149.
140. Dworkin, Law's Empire, 248 (emphasis added).
141. Dworkin maintains steadfastly that for every legal issue there is a single "right answer". See
"Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?" in Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 119-45. The
purpose of his interpretive theory is to provide a formal method for determining "right answers."
142. Dworkin, Law's Empire, 381-82. See also Ronald Dworkin, "Rights as Trumps," in Jeremy
Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 153-67.
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Dworkin "in the last analysis ... responsive to [the judge's] political
judgment."' 45
Similar to Dworkin's method of "principled integrity" is Stephen
Macedo's "principled activism."'' 46  Macedo envisions a Constitution
administered and continually rewritten and revised by all persons who
qualify as "conscientious interpreters,""' 7 i.e., all who adopt his perspec-
tive of principled activism. Like Dworkin, Macedo contends that only by
"fusing constitutional interpretation and moral theory""'8 can the Constitu-
tion be read as "the best it can be."' 49 He recommends that this fusion
occur under the formal methodology of principled activism. That method
calls upon judges (and all other "conscientious interpreters") to take several
factors into account in interpreting the Constitution. These factors include
"the text itself and ... the structure of the document as a whole, the nature
of the institutions it sets up, the powers and rights it enumerates, and the
principles and purposes implicit in these words, structures, institutions,
powers, and rights."' 5° Furthermore, while Macedo objects to the special
authoritative weight traditionally given judicial interpretations of the
Constitution,' 5 ' he acknowledges that sometimes caselaw "become[s] part
of the public's understanding of our fundamental law.'' 152  Hence, he
states that "[r]eceived authoritative interpretations and practices [i.e., cases
which stand as precedent] deserve to be taken seriously."'' 53
Yet under Macedo's principled activism all these factors count only as
"helpful guides" to interpreting the Constitution. 54 Macedo contends that
certain considerations of political morality are of greater importance for
constitutional meaning than text, structure, purpose, or precedent. He
claims that constitutional interpretation is most fundamentally a "moral
enterprise,' ' 55 and that "conscientious interpreters" must "engag[e] in
moral reflection ... to complete the meaning" of the Constitution.'56
145. Dworkin, Law's Empire, 257. See also Arthur, The Unfinished Constitution, 2-3, 24
(following Dworkin in claiming that constitutional interpretation "reflects deep moral and political
tensions" and involves two interpretive "aspects" (read Dworkin's "dimensions"), "fit" and "charity"
(paralleling Dworkin's "fit" and "justification")).
146. Macedo, Liberal Virtues. See also Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 5, 49-85.
147. Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 170-73, 181. See also Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution,
23, 50, 54-55, 67, 84-85, 95, 98, 112.
148. Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 5. See also ibid., 55 ("Only by fusing
constitutional and moral theory can interpreters at once vindicate and justify the Constitution's authority
as supreme law.").
149. Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 170, 189. Further paralleling Dworkin, Macedo claims that it is
principally in the adjudication of "hard cases" that "moral criticism is urgent." Ibid., 96.
150. Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 10. See also ibid., 49, 103.
151. Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 144-52. See also Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 95-96.
152. Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 10.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid.
155. Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 172. Cf. ibid., 147 ("[C]onstitutional interpretation is an eminently
political enterprise.").
156. Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 16.
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Macedo finds that meaning lodged in the principles of political morality
that he identifies with the Constitution's Framers. He asserts that the
Constitution rests on a moral foundation of justice and individual rights as
expressed in classical liberalism and associated with the natural rights
tradition.157  This political point of view stresses individual rights,
especially economic liberty and property rights. 5 ' Macedo contends that
all who interpret the Constitution conscientiously must give it "the morally
best meaning" 9 consistent with these individual rights and, overall, with
liberalism's aspirations to justice and liberty. 60 In this way, he concludes
that there is a single "correct answer" for even the most intractable of
constitutional questions.161 This answer may be consistent with prece-
dent, and may conform with the Constitution's text, structure, and purpose.
But it need not. The determining factor for principled activism is "moral
judgment"; that is, Macedo asserts that the essential question in constitu-
tional interpretation is "which interpretation ... constitutes a better vision
of what America stands for?"' 162
Robert Bork agrees with Dworkin and Macedo that constitutional
interpretation must be "principled," yet he strongly rejects the type of
explicit appeal to moral philosophy that Dworkin and Macedo recommend.
Bork calls upon judges to render decisions which comport with his notion
of "neutral principles."'' 63  Courts must, on his account, base their
decisions on principles which are neutrally derived in that they "transcend
any immediate result that is involved,"' 64 while remaining "exterior to the
will of the Justices. '165 Bork regards this notion of neutrality as essential
to principled constitutional adjudication: if a court maintains a neutral
perspective in the derivation, definition, and application of constitutional
rights, its decision is principled and justified; but if it fails to remain neutral
at each stage in the interpretive process, the decision is unprincipled-an
instance of illegitimate judicial lawmaking. 166
157. Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 203-53. See also Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 20,
22, 31, 46.
158. Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 180-81, 190-92, 197-200. See also Macedo, The New Right v. The
Constitution, 55-67, 82-85, 102. Macedo acknowledges that there are noneconomic liberties and rights.
Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 178-79, 186-89, 192-97. See also Macedo, The New Right v. The
Constitution, 67-82. In addition, he favors broad interpretation of the Ninth Amendment. Macedo,
Liberal Virtues, 173, 179. See also Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 10, 46, 99.
Nevertheless, he is primarily concerned with broadening the extent to which economic freedom is
protected under the Constitution.
159. Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 15.
160. Ibid., 20, 23, 94-95.
161. Ibid., 69.
162. Ibid.
163. See Bork, "Neutral Principles," 2, 7.
164. Ibid., 2 (quoting Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 27).
165. Ibid., 6.
166. Ibid., 6-8, 23.
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On this account, courts may never legitimately turn to values deduced
from abstract philosophical reasoning, 167 for, according to Bork, there are
no demonstrable truths of moral philosophy 168 and no principled way to
cast any in constitutional armor. 16 9  He claims that judicial practice
should be confined to a mechanical inquiry into the political morality of the
Founding Fathers. The object of adjudication, he says, is to "relate[] the
Framers' values to today's world"'170 by turning the morality of the
Constitution's Framers into rules applicable to present circumstances.
Drawing purportedly from the Constitution's text, structure, and histo-
ry,17' Bork contends that the political morality of the Framers is embed-
ded in the structure of government they created under the Constitution.
Labelling that structure "Madisonian majoritarianism,"'' 72 he claims the
American constitutional system contains two basic principles: representative
democracy 173 and a "counter-majoritarian premise" establishing a narrow
realm of social life where individual rights stand paramount over the will
of the majority. 74 Under this definition of the structure of government
established by the Constitution, Bork maintains that courts must defer to
the will of the majority as expressed through legislative value choices, 75
except in the narrow realm of individual rights. 76 To the extent courts
upset this preference for democratic decisionmaking by assigning
constitutional stature to individual rights derived from normative consider-
ations unconnected with the political structure of Madisonian majoritarian-
ism, Bork concludes their decisions are unprincipled and unjustified, and
should be overturned.
77
Despite his protests against philosophy and abstract political theory,
Bork's method of constitutional adjudication ironically rests upon his own
theoretical conception of the governmental structure established by the
Constitution. Madisonian majoritarianism is as much a normative theory
of political morality as is Dworkin's rights thesis or Macedo's version of
classical liberalism. For all three, "principled" interpretation-whether
principled in terms of integrity, activism, or neutrality-amounts to a
formal method of constitutional inquiry where answers are deemed "right"
167. Robert Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1984), 7.
168. Ibid.; Bork, "The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights," 696.
169. Bork, "Neutral Principles," 8, 10.
170. Bork, Tradition and Morality, 10.
171. See ibid., 8; Bork, "The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights," 695, 696; Bork, "Neutral
Principles," 1, 8, 22-23.
172. Bork, "Neutral Principles," 2-3.
173. Bork, Tradition and Morality, 9.
174. Bork, "Neutral Principles," 3.
175. Ibid., 10-11.
176. Bork, Tradition and Morality, 11.
177. Bork, "Neutral Principles," 11.
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insofar as they conform to predetermined principles of political morality
and sound governmental structure.
Many other writers embrace this general externalist methodological
approach, disagreeing only over the applicable principles of political
morality. John Hart Ely, for example, agrees with Bork that the Constitu-
tion endorses two fundamental values, on his account "the protection of
popular government ... and the protection of minorities from denials of
equal concern and respect."' 78 Claiming that both of these values "aris[e]
from a common duty of representation," Ely contends that constitutional
cases are decided rightly if they follow from a "participation-oriented,
representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review.'' 179  Gary
Jacobsohn agrees with a different aspect of Bork's approach, as he argues
that judges should interpret the Constitution to "retrieve ... the constitu-
tional aspirations of the Framers."' 80 Unlike Bork, however, Jacobsohn
claims that this exercise in retrieval involves an appeal to "fuzzy concepts
of natural justice,"'' not merely the mechanical application of a political
theory like Madisonian majoritarianism. Nevertheless, Jacobsohn contends
that the fuzzy concepts have identifiable and determinate content which can
be drawn from the Declaration of Independence, 8 2 the intentions of the
Constitution's Framers, 83 and the writings and speeches of Abraham
Lincoln.' 84 Bernard Siegan likewise identifies what he takes to be the
essential political principles of American constitutionalism and then argues,
in a manner similar to that of Professor Macedo, for increased judicial
protection of economic liberties. 185  David A.J. Richards maintains, like
Macedo and Dworkin, that the Constitution is essentially a testament to
178. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 86-87.
179. Ibid., 87.
180. Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration, 140.
181. Ibid., 139.
182. See ibid., 1, 20-21, 102-03, 108-12. Jacobsohn regards the Declaration of Independence "as
providing the core meaning to the Constitution." He writes that, "those who in their official
responsibilities are sworn to uphold the Constitution ... are not misguided should their interpretive
judgments rely upon the natural rights precepts of the Declaration." Ibid., 103. Others who maintain
that constitutional meaning can be drawn in substantial part from the principles set forth in the
Declaration of Independence include George Anastaplo, "The Declaration of Independence," St. Louis
University Law Journal 9 (1965): 390, 398-412; Harry V. Jaffa, "Book Review: Equality as a
Conservative Principle," Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 8 (1975): 471, 476-77; Pilon, "Freedom,
Responsibility, and the Constitution," 508-11; John Ray, 'The Declaration of Independence in the
Original Understanding of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," Lincoln Law
Review 20 (1992): 115-35.
183. Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration, 14-36, 60-73,
76-86. See also Jacobsohn, "E.T.: The Extra-Textual in Constitutional Interpretation," Constitutional
Commentary 1 (1984): 21-42.
184. Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration, 8, 95-114. See
also Robert A. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) (drawing
heavily upon Lincoln to resolve questions of constitutional interpretation).
185. Siegan, Economic Liberties and the Constitution. See also Bernard H. Siegan, The Supreme
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abstract moral values and should be "interpreted in a normative way, so as
to provide the best theory of the values of the [American constitutional]
tradition."'' t 6  He thus directs judges to read the Constitution according
to the "best moral and political theory,"'' 8 7 which he sees as a combina-
tion of John Locke and John Rawls.188
The list could go on, as the variety of externalist theories is rich and
diffuse. Yet even this brief survey suffices to show that while the many
externalist characterizations of constitutional vision and method vary
markedly, they share certain foundational assumptions. These assumptions
mark from the outset the sharp contrast between the practices of externalist
jurisprudence and adjudication.
First, as I have stressed throughout this essay, the most fundamental
difference between externalism and judicial practice is one of orientation:
externality or internality. Legal scholars who evaluate judicial decisions on
the basis of criteria external to the practice of adjudication engage in a
cognitive enterprise fundamentally different than that of deliberating over
and rendering decisions in the restrictive context of concrete disputes
arising within judicial practice. Second, externalist theory is essentially
result-oriented, whereas adjudication is practice-oriented. Externality
emphasizes, theoretically and critically, the outcomes reached in adjudica-
tion; while viewed critically from the standpoint of internality, those very
same judicial decisions are justified not on the basis of their results, but
insofar as they satisfy the conditions of adjudicative excel-
lence-impartiality, reasoned explanation, articulative boundaries,
coherence, and workability. Third, externalist writers rely heavily on
abstract generalities. They posit, for use in adjudication, normative
standards of justice, rights, or political morality which take the form of
abstract general rules or principles known a priori. Courts, to the contrary,
often expressly reject such abstract essentialist definitions in favor of
meanings worked out in practice. Fourth, externalist jurists work from
within a rationalist paradigm where particular constitutional provisions are
said to have determinate meaning accessible by deductive reasoning from
the predetermined abstract general rules and principles. 89 This rationalist
model stands at odds with judicial practice, where legal meaning is
186. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution, 30.
187. Ibid.
188. See Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism; Richards, Toleration and the
Constitution; Richards, "Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Problem of Change and
Stability in Constitutional Interpretation," University of Dayton Law Review 4 (1979): 295-303.
189. In this respect, externalism resembles nineteenth-century Legal Formalism. See H.L.A. Hart,
"Jhering's Heaven of Concepts and Modem Analytical Jurisprudence," in Essays in Jurisprudence and
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 265, 269 (describing the formalist model of adjudication
in terms of logical deduction from fixed general rules); Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1961), 124-27 (same). See generally, Douglas Lind, "Free Legal Decision and the
Interpretive Re-Turn in Modem Legal Theory," American Journal of Jurisprudence 38 (1993): 159-88.
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primarily a product of empirical investigation, and of reasoning by analogy
and induction. Finally, externality depends on an interpretive assumption,
the assumption that all constitutional adjudication involves interpreta-
tion.'" ° Internally, this assumption is rejected in judicial practice, as
judges regard nearly all constitutional adjudication as involving application
of the Constitution, not its interpretation.' 9'
Yet externalism stands not only in contrast to, but in opposition to
judicial practice. The opposition comes across most clearly in those
instances in which external legal theorists call into question the more basic
precepts of judicial practice. For one, many externalist jurists challenge the
interpretive authority of the courts by rejecting the notion of judicial
finality. Within the practice of adjudication it is well established that the
highest court of a jurisdiction is the final arbiter of constitutional meaning.
This is particularly true of the United States Supreme Court.'9 2 External-
ist jurists challenge this doctrine of finality, claiming that the interpretations
of all non-judges who exhibit the "proper" constitutional attitude are
entitled to the same authoritative weight as judicial applications of the
Constitution. 19
Another point of opposition between externalist jurisprudence and
judicial practice is the significance each attaches to a constitution's
preamble. Historically, courts have looked circumspectly at the prefatory
language found in many legal documents, whether preliminary recitals in
contracts, statutory statements of findings and purpose, or, especially,
preambles to constitutions. Preambles tend to be intentionally vague and
rhetorical statements of the general purposes, goals, and objectives behind
the formation of a government. The preambles found in the federal and
state constitutions typically declare, among other things, that government
190. See Ronald Dworkin, "Law as Interpretation," in W.J.T. Mitchell, ed., The Politics of
Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 249 ("I shall argue that legal practice is
an exercise in interpretation."). See also Drucilla Cornell, "Two Lectures on the Normative Dimensions
of Community in the Law," Tennessee Law Review 54 (1987): 327-43; Michael S. Moore, "The
Interpretive Turn in Modem Theory: A Turn for the Worse?" Stanford Law Review 41 (1989): 871-957.
191. Burnet v. Coronado Oil Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
192. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution."); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)
(Supreme Court "is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and
national interests."); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942) (Supreme Court is "the final
arbiter when the question is raised as to what is a permissible limitation on the full faith and credit
clause."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the province
and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is.").
193. See Burt, The Constitution in Conflict; Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of
Constitutional Aspiration, 95-137; Levinson, Constitutional Faith, 46-53; Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 144-
52; Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 95-96; Edwin Meese, "The Law of the Constitution,"
Tulane Law Review 61 (1987): 979-90. Cf. Lively and Podgor, "Reckoning with the Bluster of
Apolitical Jurisprudence," 716 (claiming that under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall the federal
Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century "arrogated" constitutional development and meaning).
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is established to secure the blessings of liberty 194 or freedom, 95 to
establish justice,19 6 to insure domestic tranquility,' 97 and to promote the
general or common welfare. 198  When pressed to "enforce" a preamble,
courts at the very most apply an irrebuttable presumption that the
challenged governmental action conforms to the preamble's general declara-
tions.' 99 Within the context of judicial practice courts can do nothing
more, for by their nature preambles defy judicial application. Their broad-
sweeping terms and phrases contain no substantive content and offer courts
no interpretive direction.2 ° Courts accordingly can make little practical
use of the language in a preamble as they struggle to craft workable,
coherent, and bounded rules of constitutional law. As ambitious recitations
of hope, preambles simply do not lend themselves to enforcement in a
manner consistent with those conditions of adjudicative excellence.
External legal theorists look very differently at preambles. They see
them as the central repositories of a constitution's most fundamental values
and aspirations. For many externalist writers, especially those trained in
political science, constitutional interpretation begins with the preamble, and
proceeds properly only when all substantive provisions are read in light of
the preamble's broad normative parameters.2 0 ' Yet these writers do not
acknowledge that this attitude toward the interpretive significance of
194. See Ala. Const., pmbl.; Conn. Const., pmbl.; Ky. Const., pmbl.; Md. Const., pmbl.; N.J.
Const., pmbl.; N.C. Const., pmbl.; R.I. Const., pmbl; U.S. Const., pmbl.; Wyo. Const., pmbl.
195. See Cal. Const., pmbl.; Idaho Const., pmbl.; Nev. Const., pmbl.; N.Y. Const., pmbl.; Ohio
Const., pmbl.
196. Ga. Const., pmbl.; Ind. Const., pmbl.; S.D. Const., pmbl.; U.S. Const, pmbl.
197. See Nev. Const., pmbl.; S.D. Const., pmbl.; U.S. Const., pmbl. Cf. Ind. Const., pmbl.
(maintain public order).
198. See Idaho Const., pmbl; Ohio Const., pmbl.; S.D. Const., pmbl.; U.S. Const., pmbl.
199. See Palmer v. Tingle, 45 N.E. 313, 314 (1896) (Where the preamble to the Ohio Constitution
declares: "We, the people of the State of Ohio, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, to secure its
blessings and promote our common welfare, do establish this Constitution," the Ohio Supreme Court
ruled, "[lI]t must be presumed that the laws to be passed by the general assembly under the powers
conferred by [the constitution] are to be such as shall secure the blessings of freedom, and promote our
common welfare.").
200. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905):
We pass without extended discussion the suggestion that the particular section of the statute of
Massachusetts now in question ... is in derogation of rights secured by the Preamble of the
Constitution of the United States. Although that Preamble indicates the general purposes for
which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the
source of any substantive power conferred on the Government of the United States or on any
of its Departments. Such powers embrace only those expressly granted in the body of the
Constitution and such as may be implied from those so granted. Although, therefore, one of
the declared objects of the Constitution was to secure the blessings of liberty to all under the
sovereign jurisdiction and authority of the United States, no power can be exerted to that end
by the United States unless, apart from the Preamble, it be found in some express delegation
of power or in some power to be properly implied therefrom.
See also United States v. Kinnebrew Motor Co., 8 F. Supp. 535, 539 (W.D. Okla. 1934), cert.
dismissed, 296 U.S. 669 (1935); United States v. Boyer, 85 F. 425, 430 (W.D. Mo. 1898).
201. See Barber, On What the Constitution Means, 34, 51-53; Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 95, 172;
Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution, 94-95, 98; Richards, Foundations of American
Constitutionalism, 105.
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preambles is a product of their own training and interpretive methodology.
Nor do they consider whether the interpretive weight they assign preambles
may run counter to the conditions of excellence which regulate judicial
practice. Instead, they forge ahead using preambles to derive constitutional
meaning as the methodology of their craft dictates, while criticizing the
courts for not agreeing with their interpretations.2"
External legal theorists also treat the intentions of the Constitution's
Framers very differently than do judges. While courts often rely on indicia
of Framer intent to craft rules of constitutional law, they do not consider
such intent to be conclusive of constitutional meaning. Within judicial
practice, every reference to Framer intent functions either (1) as an
analytical devise for extricating constitutional meaning from a particularly
ambiguous clause," 3 (2) as confirmatory or persuasive evidence that a
proposed reading of the text is a reasonable application of the Constitu-
20tion, ° or (3) as a largely rhetorical attempt to bolster a reading of the
Constitution which is principally supported by other reasons. 205  Within
externalist jurisprudence, in contrast, Framer intent carries far more weight;
some even regard it as unconditionally binding on courts and conclusively
determinative of constitutional meaning. °6
Perhaps most importantly, externalist jurisprudence opposes judicial
practice in regard to the relative significance of moral theory for constitu-
tional interpretation. Symbolized by recurrent use of normative terms and
concepts-aspirations, autonomy, ideals, icons, integrity, faith, dignity,
human good, virtue, civil religion, charity, moral beliefs, moral vision,
moral evolution, natural law, higher law-the visions pronounced by
externalist theory suggest that constitutional interpretation is part of a grand
normative enterprise. These visions involve noble quests, often undertaken
by heroes of American or ancient mythology. Professor Dworkin harks
back to Hercules and ancient Greece, metaphorically casting adjudication
in terms of demigods consulting oracles of truth. Macedo, Bork, and many
others journey to the era of the Constitution's founding, proclaiming
202. See Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 95.
203. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-18 (1831); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-08 (1819).
204. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
264 n.4 (1989); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 333-35 (1988); United States v. Ptasynski, 462
U.S. 74, 80-82 (1983); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1982);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 410-12 (1934).
205. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 396-97 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 178 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring).
206. See Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1989); Berger, Government by Judiciary; Bork, "Neutral Principles"; Lino A. Graglia,
"How the Constitution Disappeared," in Jack N. Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate
over Original Intent (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), 35-50; Edwin Meese, "Address
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idolatrous faith in the document's Framers, or at least others of their time,
believing that they had special insight into the true nature of justice, rights,
and the relationship between government and governed, sovereign and
subject. °7 Sometimes the quests involve journeys back less far in time
in the hope of reclaiming the exalted moral visions of certain significant
figures in America's political past, Andrew Jackson, for example,208 or
Abraham Lincoln.20 9  At other times, externalist vision treks into the fu-
ture. 210  Whether backward- or forward-looking, externalist visionaries
strive to improve our understanding of the aspirations, principles, and moral
implications of the United States Constitution, viewed as a document either
ideal in its original form or, like the ever-developing deity of Teilhard de
Chardin, constituted necessarily and irreversibly toward increasing
perfection.
Unfortunately, this noble enterprise, in an earlier form aptly characterized
by Roscoe Pound as the search for "the notion of a logically derivable
,,211 is fosuperconstitution, is from the standpoint of internality wholly
unnecessary and beside the point. Within the practice of adjudication,
abstract moral theory, no matter how compelling, is considered an
irrelevant and unreliable indicator of constitutional meaning.212  Judges
are bound to apply the Constitution as it is (which is to say, as they, in
their impartial, considered judgment, see it to be), not as it "ought" to be,
nor as individual judges would like it to be.2t 3 They must take the
207. See Berns, Taking the Constitution Seriously, 236 ("The Framers had a better grasp of these
matters [of constitutional principle].").
208. Frank Easterbrook, "Abstraction and Authority," University of Chicago Law Review 59 (1992):
349, 356.
209. See Arkes, Beyond the Constitution, 11, 15-20, 36-52, 80, 107, 154; Levinson, Constitutional
Faith; Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration, 8, 95-114.
210. See Vincent Blasi, "The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment," Columbia Law
Review 85 (1985): 449-514 (inquiring into "what perspective on the future should guide courts in
interpreting the ... First Amendment"); Perry, The Constitution, The Courts, and Human Rights, 98-
101, 113-25, 138-54 (advocating that the Constitution be interpreted to serve "moral evolution").
211. Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1954), 1.
212. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)
(objecting to natural law reasoning). Cf. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 959 (1988)
("Happily, our task is not to resolve the philosophical meaning of free will .. "); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for basing its holding on a
particular economic theory: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics.").
213. Here lies the core of the difference between external jurisprudence and judicial practice. To
externalist jurists, adjudication ought to be a matter of deciding what the law ought to be. See Arthur
Selwyn Miller, "On the Need for 'Impact Analysis' of Supreme Court Decisions," in Theodore L.
Becker, ed., The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 7
(identifying as "the problem in constitutional adjudication: the need for deciding what the law 'ought
to be."'). But from within their craft-bound practice judges recognize that constitutional adjudication
is not a matter of simply engrafting on the law their views on politics and morality. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992) ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive
to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d)
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Constitution as a whole-its language, ascertainable intent, and overall
structure, set within the context of American history (good and bad), and
the traditions (good and bad) of American constitutionalism. Unlike
externalist jurists, who, like appellate lawyers, work within a practice which
encourages and rewards creative and selective use of this material so as to
present arguments on behalf of particular points of view, judges may not
assume the posture of advocate. Whether advocacy goes from attorney to
client or from jurist to idea, ideal, aspiration, or vision of a higher, moral
law, advocacy demands partiality and bias. Judicial practice, to the
contrary, rests foremost on the assumption that the judge or judges
presiding over a case have no interest in the outcome. 214  "Interest," in
this context, is far broader than a personal or monetary stake. It includes
any theoretical reason or ground-religious, moral, political, aesthetic,
economic, whatever-which may make a judge predisposed to deciding a
case one way or another. When externalist jurists advocate visions of
justice and moral right, however, they purposefully try to influence judges
to adopt certain moral predispositions. This places externalist jurispru-
dence, in terms of its basic purpose and objective, directly at odds with the
conditions of excellence which regulate judicial practice. Judges according-
ly respond in silence to externalist advocacy because judicial acceptance of
the moral visions the externalists posit would undermine the fundamental
internal requirements of judicial practice that judges act impartially and
without bias.21 5
It is for this reason that decisional law is replete with evidence of judges
fighting against the temptation to play the part of Dworkin's Hercules or
Macedo's conscientious interpreter. The federal Supreme Court on
occasion reminds itself of this fact, cautioning that "not even the tempta-
tions of a hard case" can overcome "the duty of all courts" to work within
the practical limits of their craft.216 Yet sometimes the Court cannot
mask its dismay at realizing that the remedy for an obvious injustice lay
(Marshall, C.J.)) ("[D]iscretionary choices are not left to a court's inclination, but to its judgment; and
its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.").
214. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820-27 (1986). See also William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1768; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979),
3:361 (Noting that "judge[s] ... [are] sworn to administer impartial justice, ... [and that their]
authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.").
215. I am not suggesting that all, or even very many, judges actually attain the degree of
impartiality and nonbias demanded by their practice. Within every technical, craft-bound activity, there
are but few true craft masters. What I am suggesting is that we should not reject or revise the internally
determined standards of excellence for any craft-bound practice just because those standards are difficult
(or even nearly impossible) to achieve. To reject the conditions of excellence for adjudicative practice
because few judges can fully and consistently satisfy them would be as senseless as it would be to
lower the standards of excellence for epic poetry, classical music composition, or baseball because there
are so few with the talents of Milton, Mozart, or Mays.
216. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1947).
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beyond its reach. In Leffingwell v. Warren, for example, the Court stated
with frustration:
The equities in behalf of the plaintiff below, are strong. We have all
felt their force. Without any fault on his part, he has been divested of
the title to his land. But our duty is to apply the law-not to make it.
If this statute be unwise or unjust the remedial power lies with the
Legislature of the State, and not with this Court.217
And sometimes the Justices will admit political distaste for a decision they
find mandated by the law. In Texas v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy,
concurring in the Court's opinion that flag-burning is a form of free
expression protected by the First Amendment, wrote:
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not
like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the
law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result. And so
great is our commitment to the process that, except in the rare case,
we do not pause to express distaste for the result, perhaps for fear of
undermining a valued principle that dictates the decision.2 8
Arguably, judges do on occasion bend to the temptation. The historical
development of modern choice-of-law rules giving courts broad, result-
oriented discretion over which jurisdiction's law to apply in a particular
controversy is perhaps the clearest example of the type of legal/moral
fusion Dworkin and Macedo, among others, recommend. Courts at the
cutting edge of choice-of-law jurisprudence a few decades ago often spoke
Dworkin-like, rendering decisions aimed at making the law "the best it can
be.
, 2 19
Yet not even a body of morally impregnated law like choice-of-law
jurisprudence can establish the claim made by externalists like Dworkin and
Macedo that constitutional adjudication requires broad moral speculation.
The Constitution does not explicitly outline the extent to which moral
inquiry is appropriate for determining constitutional meaning. Nor does it
suggest the methods judges should use to reach decisions based upon moral
principles. Moreover, as others have argued, there are good reasons to
doubt the externalist claim that the Constitution has inscribed in it either a
fixed moral formula for interpretation or a general interpretive demand for
its own moral reformation or purification.22 °
217. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 599, 606 (1862).
218. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989).
219. Dworkin, Law's Empire, 248. See Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 19 N.E.2d 992, 995
(1939) (inquiring "whether one rule or the other produces the best practical result"); Cipolla v.
Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 (1970) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (advocating "better rule of law approach" for
deciding which state's guest statute to apply).
220. See Steven J. Burton, Judging in Good Faith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
47-49 (arguing that certain constitutional provisions prohibit moral inquiry by logical implication).
[Vol. 6: 353
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Justifying any claim about the appropriate (or required) use of moral
principle within constitutional adjudication requires, therefore, either appeal
to externalist theory or an internal investigation into the practice of judging.
I have outlined above the externalist approach. From the point of view of
internality, we can only ascertain the relevance of moral principle for
constitutional adjudication by following Wittgenstein's directive: "[D]on't
think, but look!"22' It is illusory to think that from outside judicial
practice we can somehow grasp how normative considerations are used
within. Hence, rather than "thinking" abstractly about which assertedly
immutable principles of right will make the Constitution best as a matter
of political morality, we must "look" into judicial practice to detect, if
possible, patterns or methods of moral inquiry.
Such a Wittgensteinian "look" reveals that moral considerations do figure
importantly in constitutional adjudication, but only in ways strictly
determined by the internal requirements of the practice. Certain constitu-
tional provisions, such as the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause, are exceedingly "open-textured." While denying that the vagueness
brought about by open-texture permits judges to draw upon their personal
conceptions of political morality,222 the Supreme Court acknowledges that
the meanings it discerns for open-textured clauses often depend in part on
normative considerations. 23  This does not mean that the Court appeals
to abstract conceptions of political morality. Rather, it directs its inquiry
into the practice of adjudication. For within that practice we find the
fusion of law and morality which has so eluded the externalists. They have
missed it because they look in the wrong place. Far from a fusion of
substantive constitutional law with abstract moral theory, the fusion which
takes place within constitutional adjudication links concrete, relativistic
moral facts with the practice of adjudication itself. As a result, whatever
ethical content an open-textured clause may have, the point of view of
internality regards it as strictly "derived from considerations that are fused
in the whole nature of. . . judicial process. 224
Sometimes courts find their practice fused with morality when normative
considerations provide precisely the critical insight necessary for deciding
a case reasonably and coherently. Usually this form of judicial inquiry into
morality proceeds by way of appeal to values or standards apparent in or
logically compelled by the practice of social life within the community or,
more broadly, within the practice of civilized living per se. Thus, the
221. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, :66.
222. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 170-72 (1952).
223. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Harper, 383 U.S. at 669-70; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
224. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court has decided constitutional cases on the basis of "contempo-
rary standards of decency," ' 5 "principles of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal, '226 "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society,' ' 22 and "the community's sense of fair play and decen-
cy. '228  Yet in making these various moral appeals, the Court engages in
a method of moral reasoning very different from externalist inquiry into
abstract, formal principles of "higher law." The Court does not debate
philosophically the merits of alternative moral theories; nor does it assume
any absolute, objective moral truths.229  Rather, it looks for empirical
evidence of values or standards as they exist within the relevant community
of human thought and social life. 230  And it uses that evidence not as the
decisive major premise in a deductive argument, but only as necessary to
craft an opinion which will satisfy its craft-bound objectives of coherence
and reasoned explanation.23'
Normative considerations also enter into (become fused with) judicial
practice in a second way, through a process of reasoning reminiscent of
Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblances." When required to decide
an issue under an open-textured clause whose content is at least partially
moral, the Court often looks to the product of its craft-bound practice, the
"families" of prior caselaw. With a concrete case in hand, it searches that
product for "similarities [and] relationships. 232 What it finds, if there is
a "family of cases" on point,233 is a "vast net of family likenesses, 234
225. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (plurality opinion).
226. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.).
227. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
228. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.).
229. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (Douglas, J.) (1966) ("[T]he
Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era."); Snyder, 291 U.S.
at 105 (Reasoning that a state may "regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own
conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," while cautioning that a
state "procedure does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem
to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar.").
230. For a philosophical account of this type of moral reasoning, see J.L. Mackie, "Can There Be
a Right-Based Moral Theory?" in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1984), 168-81. Cf. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, 187 (moral virtues are to be
understood by considering the "particular type of practice" which provides the arena wherein those
virtues are exhibited).
231. See Regents of U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("[Tihe
mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines
the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next, a critical
feature of its coherent interpretation.").
232. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:66.
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"a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing:
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." 35
This is the method of Griswold v. Connecticut,236 where the Court
found a network of overlapping, criss-crossing similarities in several earlier
cases arising under various provisions of the Bill of Rights. Justice
Douglas discerned from this network of family likenesses "that specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. 237
It is also the method of Plessy v. Ferguson.238 When Plessy came
before the Court it was a novel case. Judicial reactionism in the post-Civil
War period had "virtually strangled [the Equal Protection Clause] in infan-
cy."'239 Accordingly, nearly all equal protection cases prior to Plessy
concerned businesses or individuals contesting state or local regulatory
measures which allegedly impaired their economic freedom.24° While a
few cases involved challenges to state criminal procedure24' and one an
attack on state civil procedure,242 these cases, like their economic counter-
parts, conceived of the Equal Protection Clause as meaning nothing more
than "that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection
of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and under like circumstances. 243 When Plessy forced the Court to
consider the constitutionality of a state statute mandating the social segrega-
tion of the races, there was no immediate network of similar cases. The
"family" of cases with which the Court could compare the challenged
legislation consisted only of distant cousins. Since in the areas of
economic regulation and state judicial procedure the Court had developed
a net of criss-crossing cases which found equal protection satisfied so long
as persons were treated equally "in the same place and under like
circumstances," the groundwork was in place for "separate but equal."
As the lone dissenter in Plessy, Justice Harlan essentially implored the
majority to recognize that the existing body of equal protection caselaw
was so dissimilar to the case at bar that they should address more directly
the moral implications of their decision. Harlan foresaw correctly that the
235. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:66. For helpful discussions of Wittgenstein's
notion of family resemblance, see G.P Baker and P.M.S Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and
Understanding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 185-208; Haig Khatchadourian, "Common
Names and 'Family Resemblances,"' in George Pitcher, ed., Wittgenstein: The Philosophical
Investigations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968).
236. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
237. Ibid., 484-85.
238. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
239. Regents of U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (quoting Joseph Tussman and
Jacobus tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws," California Law Review 37 (1949): 381).
240. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
241. See Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692 (1891); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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decision in Plessy would "in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the
decision ... in the Dred Scott Case."2 4  Yet he did not try to sway his
colleagues by reasoning deductively from an abstract higher law conception
of equality. Indeed, Harlan himself suggested that it is perfectly appropri-
ate (constitutionally, at least) to refuse equal treatment to members of at
least one particular race.245  His moral opposition to the majority's
decision was strictly craft-bound to the practice of adjudication. He
castigated the Court for rendering a decision which was unworkable
("permit[s] the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of
law"), 2 6 incoherent ("The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of
race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly
inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law
established by the Constitution."), 247  and insupportable by reasoned
explanation ("It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds.").248
Even a cursory look at these two ways whereby moral inquiry fuses with
the practice of constitutional adjudication shows that morality does figure
importantly in the practice. The Supreme Court will consider evidence of
moral values and standards, and will draw inferences from moral principles
embedded in prior caselaw, insofar as doing so will help it render its next
decision in a manner which satisfies the conditions of adjudicative
excellence. Yet these methods differ markedly from appeals to abstract
moral principles which, according to the Court, simply "do not carry [it]
far., 249  The practice of judging involves far more than performing
logical deductions from a priori moral principles. Judges must deliberate
dispassionately, maintaining, on the one hand, the "requisite detachment"
from personal views toward morality,250 while affirming, on the other,
their "commitment to the process. 2 1  Only in that framework of craft
excellence do moral principles find a place in the Constitution.
None of this should be taken to suggest that the purpose and function of
judicial practice is any less noble, any less grand, any less normative, even,
244. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
245. See ibid., 561 ('There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those
belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few
exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race."). Harlan went on to
criticize the Louisiana statute at issue not because it violated some fundamental moral notion of
equality, but because it ironically treated Chinese better than Blacks:
[B]y the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens
of the United States, while citizens of the black race in Louisiana .... are yet declared to be






249. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608 (1903).
250. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952).
251. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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than extemalist theory. It is only to say that the nobility, grandeur, and
normative force of adjudication is to be found in a different place. The
justification of judicial practice lies not in the outcomes it achieves, but in
the method of achievement. At its functional core, adjudication is a
method of dispute resolution, an instrument of social order. "Excellence"
in judicial practice reflects practical workability relative to that functional
objective. It is an evaluative notion going to how efficiently and
effectively the practice works to resolve conflict while maintaining the
bonds, including the basic values and beliefs, of a society.
252
Now it is true that the effectiveness of adjudication as a method of
conflict resolution is reflected marginally in the degree to which the parties
and the public are satisfied with the outcomes in individual cases.
Controversial cases addressing highly charged issues, such as the Supreme
Court's rulings in Ableman v. Booth253 (slavery), Brown v. Board of
Education254 (racial segregation), and Roe v. Wade255 (abortion), make
it appear that public acceptance plays a substantial role in the judiciary's
effectiveness. Yet even when the authority of the courts comes under
attack by those displeased with the result in one case or another, that
authority as well as the overall effectiveness of the judiciary as an arbiter
of disputes is overwhelmingly a product of how well the courts are
perceived as satisfying the conditions of adjudicative excellence. Those
conditions, which symbolically and in fact represent the judiciary's
submission to the rule of law, are as central to the basic values and beliefs
of American constitutionalism as any substantive values found in the
Constitution. To allow even the most compelling moral theory to override
the conditions of adjudicative excellence would thus subvert this nation's
commitment to the rule of law and severely impair the courts' effectiveness
and legitimacy.
From the internalist point of view, therefore, judicial decisions are
subject to meaningful critique only according to how well they conform to
the conditions of adjudicative excellence, not as to their results per se.
Brown, for example, was not decided rightly because it made the Equal
Protection clause "the best it can be,' 256 or because it contributed to
"moral growth" in the United States, 257 or even because it conformed to
252. In this respect the notion of adjudicative excellence I identify herein resembles certain aspects
of the concept of "juristic method" or "juristic skill" once developed by Karl Llewellyn and E.
Adamson Hoebel. See Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1941), 273-309. See also E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyennes: Indians
of the Great Plains (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 49-50.
253. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
254. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
255. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
256. Dworkin, Law's Empire, 379.
257. See Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights, 121.
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"our own best sense of what 'equal protection of the laws' requires. 258
Nor was it decided wrongly because it stood in opposition to certain models
of American constitutionalism or certain political viewpoints arguably held
by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 259 From the standpoint of
internality, such talk is incoherent. Judgments of right and wrong
necessarily presuppose a standard of rightness. Every externalist judgment
of constitutional right or wrong thus rests on some criterion of constitution-
al meaning. As we have observed, the interpretive criteria favored by
external legal theorists allow for determinations of constitutional meaning
prior to and wholly independent of the practice of adjudication. Yet in
constitutional interpretation, the practice of adjudication provides the only
authoritative standard of constitutional meaning. Hence, since they claim
to have access to constitutional meaning according to standards which lie
outside and stand independently of the practice of adjudication, external
legal theorists issue judgments of constitutional right and wrong which are
fundamentally, and unavoidably, irrelevant.
It thus has no bearing on constitutional meaning to say that Brown or
any other controversial judicial decision was decided rightly or wrongly if
what one means is that it conforms to some external standard of constitu-
tional interpretation. Those standards do not speak to constitutional
meaning, only constitutional desire, the ever-present search for a logically
derivable superconstitution.
Yet while it makes no sense to evaluate constitutional caselaw in terms
of right and wrong outcomes, judicial decisions affecting constitutional
meaning can quite appropriately be said to be excellent or less-than-
excellent. This judgment depends on how well the decision satisfies the
practice-specific conditions of adjudicative excellence. Here we can talk
quite sensibly in a critical, evaluative manner of the decision in Brown.
From this standpoint of internality, Brown stands as a paradigm example
of excellence in adjudicative practice. In its unanimous decision, the
Supreme Court held that the "separate but equal" standard of Plessy v.
Ferguson was no longer (if it ever had been) a workable, coherent criterion
for assessing laws mandating racial segregation. 260 Notably, the Brown
Court did not say Plessy had been decided wrongly. To say it had would
have been as meaningless in 1954 as it is today, except perhaps for
purposes of political rhetoric. The Court did say that whatever merit the
Plessy standard of separate but equal may have had in 1896, it clearly
258. Macedo, The New Right, 71. See also Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 95 (claiming the decision in
Brown is "superior" to the case it overruled, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), because it better
satisfies "the preamble's declaration that the Constitution aims to secure justice, liberty, welfare, and
other important moral goals...").
259. See Bork, "Neutral Principles," 11-15, 17; McDowell, Equity and the Constitution.
260. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
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amounted to a worthless, pernicious standard in 1954.26 To the Brown
Court, "separate but equal" was a wholly unworkable and incoherent
standard of constitutional equality for which no rational justification could
be found.262
A more recent decision matching the technical excellence of Brown is the
joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.263  Using the highly unusual, but particularly
forceful form of a joint majority opinion, the three justices reaffirmed Roe
v. Wade for reasons wholly unrelated to external considerations, and fully
dependent on the conditions of adjudicative excellence. 2' The Court
faced substantial pressure to overrule Roe's essential holding, "that viability
marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic
abortions. 265  Yet the three Justices found the viability standard still
workable 266 and coherent both in terms of subsequent caselaw develop-
ment267 and the factual assumptions made by the Roe Court.268 They
further determined that viability continues to set an articulative boundary
for the constitutionality of abortion legislation.269 And they reasoned that
only by upholding Roe, not through overruling it, could they issue a
decision which was rationally justified and consistent with the principles of
impartiality and nonbias which lie at the heart of the rule of law.
270
261. Ibid., 494 ("To separate [black school children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
262. Ibid., 494-95. The fact that the Brown Court grounded its decision in part on empirical data
drawn from the social sciences does not diminish the excellence of the opinion, or make it in any
respect externalist. Courts seek "whatever aid is available" to determine legal meaning. Regents of U.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978). Social science data, like moral principle, is relevant insofar
as it aids in the disposition of a case in a manner responsive to the conditions of adjudicative
excellence.
263. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
264. The Casey decision notably occupies a wholly different plane than externalist evaluations of
Roe and the snarly question of the morality of legalized abortion. Placed alongside the Casey majority
opinion, Ronald Dworkin's recent work on abortion and the Constitution is particularly inapposite. See
Dworkin, Life's Dominion; Dworkin, "The Center Holds!" 29-33.
265. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811.
266. Ibid., 2812 ("Although Roe has engendered opposition, it has in no sense proven 'unwork-
able."'). Cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 549-50 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (contending that Roe's trimester framework, not just the viability standard, has proven to
be workable).
267. Ibid., 2810 ("No development of constitutional law since the case was decided has implicitly
or explicitly left Roe behind as a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking.").
268. Ibid., 2811 ("We have seen how time has overtaken some of Roe's factual assumptions. ...
But these facts go only to the scheme of time limits on the realization of competing interests, and the
divergences from the factual premises of 1973 have no bearing on the validity of Roe's central holding.
... .).
269. Ibid., 2804.
270. Ibid. 2814-16. The Court wrote:
But whatever the premises of opposition may be, only the most convincing justification under
accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the
first was anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the
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In this sense of adjudicative excellence, and in this sense only, we can
thus say from the perspective of internality that Casey was decided rightly.
In so judging the Justices, we should not purport to claim, pretentiously and
haughtily, that the case was "right" in a substantive sense relating to
outcome. To make that judgment would be to arrogate for ourselves a
degree of super-appellate power and authority. And it would be to assume
that we have access to constitutional meaning independently of judicial
practice. Yet there is no such access, no authoritative external standard of
constitutional meaning. Hence, when we say that Casey was decided
rightly we can only mean "right" in the sense of excellence, as we can
imagine Maxwell Perkins might once have said to Thomas Wolfe after
reading the manuscript Look Homeward, Angel-"You did it right."
V. CONCLUSION
A "yawning gulf' no less unbridgeable than the abyss Wittgenstein
perceived between essentialist illustration and concrete application thus
separates external legal theorists from the practice of adjudication. Courts
interpret law only in the "day-to-day practice '  of its application in
concrete cases. The practice of judicial application of law is a paradigm
example of what Wittgenstein meant by practice as a form of life wherein
words and concepts find meaning, the sense of practice he saw "exhibited
in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual
cases."
272
Constitutional meaning, on this internalist account, is a product of
judicial application of law in such concrete cases and in accordance with
the craft-bound conditions of adjudicative excellence. Every act of judicial
"application" depends for its justification on its performance within judicial
practice, for only then is it subject to the practice-specific, internally
determined conditions of adjudicative excellence. Here we must stress
again application, not interpretation. Adjudication is in a very real sense
not an interpretive enterprise at all, but a forum for the practical application
of legal rules and principles-"a way of grasping a [legal] rule which is not
an interpretation. '273  Hence, just as Wittgenstein emphasized thedifference between concrete "application" and essentialist "illustration," we
principle on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance. So to overrule under fire
in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert
the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question.... A decision to overrule Roe's essential
holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of
both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment
to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's original decision,
and we do so today.
Ibid., 2815-16.
271. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:197.
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must remain ever alert to the fundamental difference between judicial
"application" of law and externalist "interpretation."
The claim of juristic externality that the Constitution has meaning outside
the practice of adjudication denies that practices are craft-bound, overlooks
the conditions of adjudicative excellence, characterizes adjudication as
essentially interpretive, and assumes that legal meaning is absolute, existing
in some abstract realm accessible to anyone with the proper interpretive
attitude. In these respects, contemporary juristic theory not only ill-fits but
stands opposed to the practice of adjudication. While assuming there to be
"real" essentialist definitions for constitutional provisions, externalists aim
to objectify the task of judicial interpretation by specifying necessary
conditions or determinative criteria for deriving that constitutional meaning.
This undercuts judicial practice by shifting attention away from the internal
conditions of adjudicative excellence. It is only those conditions of
excellence that govern the internal operation of judicial practice.
Externalism furthermore perpetuates illusion. The externalist method of
abstracting the supposedly true spirit or moral vision of the Constitution
from the text or other sources, and then positing formal rules of interpreta-
tion so as to cull from that spirit or vision the "real" definitions of
constitutional terms rests on what Wittgenstein characterized as the "strange
illusion" that from outside practice one can discern "essences" or "laws"
not grasped in practice.274 Yet this "illusory image of a greater depth"
takes us nowhere, for it rests on the mistaken appearance of common
understanding between the externalist and the practitioner.275  This
appearance is mistaken because the externalist (the constitutional scholar)
and the internalist (the judge) employ different language-games. Even
though they reference the same constitutional terms and concepts-e.g.,
equal protection, privacy, finality, preamble, Framer intent, and constitu-
tional values and aspirations-they use them differently according to the
purpose, method, and conditions of excellence of their respective practices.
As Wittgenstein noted, we learn the use of words "under particular circum-
stances,"276 that is, as active participants in practices. For this reason, we
cannot disentangle language and action. A proposition "lives"-has
meaning--only within the context of a system of language, a language-
274. Wittgenstein, The Brown Book, 1:17, 22 ("The same strange illusion ... possesses us even
more strongly if repeating a tune to ourselves and letting it make its full impression on us, . . . the idea
suggests itself that there must be a paradigm somewhere in our mind, and that we have adjusted the
tempo to conform to that paradigm."). See also Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics, VI:7-8.
275. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI:31 ("For the ground keeps on
giving us the illusory image of a greater depth, and when we seek to reach this, we keep on finding
ourselves on the old level.").
276. Wittgenstein, Last Writings, § 41; See also Wittgenstein, Zettel, §§ 114, 116; Wittgenstein,
Philosophy of Psychology, 11:200, 203.
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game. 77 Understanding the meaning of any live proposition requires
inquiry into the activity, the "whole practice" within which the language-
game serves as the language of discourse.27 8  Given the great differences
between externalist jurisprudence and judicial practice-differences in
purpose, method, and standards of excellence-it is only reasonable to
suppose that their use of common terms and concepts masks markedly
different language-games and that a profound epistemological distance
separates the jurist from the judge. Hence, when we read juristic critiques
of judicial decisionmaking we must be ever-mindful of Wittgenstein's
insights that "[w]hen language-games change, then there is a change in
concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change, 279 and
that "it is worthless and of no use whatsoever for the understanding" of a
practice to subject it to externalist evaluation. 80
In grappling with the Constitution, in wrestling with the meanings its
provisions come to acquire through adjudicative practice, we must therefore
resist the allure of externality. Constitutional adjudication-no less than
historiography, ship-building, music, art, architecture, novel writing,
baseball, or any other central human activity-is a craft-bound excellence
which can only be grasped wholly and credibly from within. 81 We must
277. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 4-5. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1:23.
278. Wittgenstein, The Brown Book, 1:48.
279. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 65.
280. Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, 111:213.
281. I imagine there may be some who would still object at this point that my thesis rests too
heavily and problematically on the analogy I draw between adjudication and all other central human
practices. One counterargument here could be that adjudication is disanalogous to ship-designing,
playing concert piano, playing baseball, etc., because practitioners in those activities, unlike judges,
produce commodities and act from self-interest. This objection simply misses the point. The central
human activities I cite differ from one another dramatically both in terms of their products and the
reasons that individuals may have for participating in them. Neither product nor motivation, however,
is the basis of the analogy. All central human activities are analogous insofar as excellence in their
performance is determined by the internal demands of the practice of the activity. Even if we believe
(which I do not) that most concert pianists or baseball players play the piano or the field for the purpose
of creating a marketable commodity, and even if we assume (which I would not) that pianists or ball
players act more from self-interest (desire, inclination) than do judges when each decides to become
or stay what they are (the requirement, for judges, of holding no interest in the outcome of cases before
them does not translate into holding no interest (no desire, no ambition) in being a judge or retaining
one's seat on the bench), the point remains that we can no more judge excellence at the piano or at bat
by thinking outside the practice of those activities than we can understand excellence in adjudication
by appealing to considerations external to judicial practice.
Another possible counterargument could go to what we often take to be the special "gifts" or
"talents" necessary for the achievement of excellence in crafts like baseball, music, or art. Adjudication
and legal criticism, so this argument would go, are crafts unlike those others because one can do them
well without being especially gifted or talented. And since no special talents are required, the line
between the practitioner and the critic of adjudication becomes blurred and easily crossed.
I disagree that talent is any less essential for achieving excellence in adjudication or criticism than
it is in baseball, music, or art. There are thousands of judges, too many lawyers, scads of amateur
baseball players, millions who sing in the shower, and an ever-growing stream of critics who vent in
cyberspace. But true craft masters in judging, lawyering, playing baseball, singing, or criticism are few.
Excellence in adjudication or criticism-that is, doing either craft and doing it well-requires talent,
talent appropriate to the craft. The line between adjudication and criticism is just as hard to bridge (but
not impossible: Holmes, Posner) as that between classical music and jazz (but Wynton Marsalis, Yo
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shake the tempting illusion that externalist theory can solve the dilemmas
judges face in their application of the Constitution. Externality can never
supplant internality. This, once again, we learn from Wittgenstein who saw
quite clearly that while "a physical theory such as Newton's cannot solve
the problems that motivated Goethe," '282 neither can Goethe's theory
about the constitution of colors assist the artist or the decorator in
performing their crafts.283 And even those two must hold fast to the
internalist point-of-view, for the decorator would be ill-advised to employ
the color concepts used by Rembrandt, who, after all, did not use gold
paint to paint a golden helmet.284
Yo Ma) or between baseball and football (but Jim Thorpe, Bo Jackson). Hence, we minimize the
genius of a Holmes, a Cardozo, or a Hand by suggesting that they could rise to the pinnacle of
excellence in judging without possessing special gifts. Similarly, we miss the point of excellence and
diminish the achievements of a Stanley Fish, a Karl Llewellyn, or an H.L.A. Hart if we infer that
excellence in legal criticism or philosophy is somehow easy.
282. Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, 111:206.
283. See ibid., 1:70-73, 111:90, 125-26.
284. See ibid., 1:58, 111:79, 263.
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